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Fairness And Bureaucracy: The Demise
of Procedural Due Process For
Welfare Claimants
By BARBARA BRUDNO*

TWO
major types of issues underlie the debate over the application
of the Fourteenth Amendments due process procedural safeguards
to welfare law:1 the constitutionality 2 of denying and the politi* Professor of Law, University of California Los Angeles; B.A., University of
California at Berkeley, 1963; M.A., University of California at Berkeley, 1964; I.D.,
University of California at Berkeley, 1967.
@ Barbara Brudno and the Hastings Law Journal 1974.
1. For a summary of the meaning of the term "welfare law" as used herein
see text accompanying note 7 infra.
Most of the income redistribution programs lumped together under the term "welfare" derive from the 1935 federal Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 620 (1935). As explained in B. BRUDNO, CAsEs AND MAmRLs ON THE I.Aw Am TH POOR 511-13 (3d
ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as BRuDNo]: "Mhe 1935 Act placed primary emphasis
on alleviating the risks of economic insecurity resulting from old age and temporary
loss of employment, and adopted a form of social insurance as the basic wealth transfer
mechanism. Public assistance [what is typically referred to as "welfare!' as opposed
to those programs known as "Social Security"], on the other hand, was added as a
residual program to transfer income [from the taxpaying public] to statutorily defined
categories of persons [e.g., the "dependent child" under the AFDC program] based
on individual need .... Beginning with the 1935 Act, the federal government has
increasingly assumed responsibility for the problem of economic insecurity ....
[C]urrent [income] transfer [or redistribution] programs ... consist of three basic
types, differentiated according to their approach to the problem of insufficient income:
(1) income-in-kind programs, which provide subsidies for such things as food, housing,
and medical care (e.g., Medicaid, Food Stamps, Public Housing); (2) social insurance
programs, which provide wage-substitutes on the basis of past employment (e.g., Old
Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance, Unemployment Insurance); and (3) public assistance programs which provide income payments to specified categories of needy individuals and families (e.g., OAA, AFDC, AB, APTD)." See generally THE PREsiDENT'S COMMISSION ON INCOME MAINTENANCE PROGRAMS, PovERTY AMID PLENTY:

THE AMEmucAN PRAsDox 4-7, 45-46, 90 (1969) [hereinafter cited as INCoME MAINTENANCE]; S. RIESENFELD & R. MAXWELL, MODERN SocIAL LEGISLATION 10-15, 461-66

(1950); Wedemeyer & Moore, The American Welfare System, 54 CALIp. L. REv. 326,
329-34, 343-51 (1966). See also R. O'NEiL, THE PiucE OF DEPENDENCY ch. IX
[8131
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cal wisdom' of mandating the safeguards of procedural due process4
(1970); F. Pivm, & R. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC
WELFARE (1971). For a discussion of the "withering-away fallacy" underlying the
public assistance provisions of the 1935 Act see G. STEINER, SOCIAL INsEcuRrrY 1847 (1966).
Income-in-kind programs differ from social insurance and public assistance programs primarily on the basis of the nature of the transfer payment: specific goods
or cash payments limited to obtaining those goods versus direct cash payments with
no built-in spending limitations. See BRUDNO, supra note 1, at 513-14.
Social insurance and public assistance programs differ primarily on the basis of
two economic factors: (1) the former are financed by taxes on employers and/or employees (future beneficiaries), while the latter are financed out of general revenues, and
(2) eligibility and benefit-level criteria for the former are based primarily on past employment, while eligibility and benefit-level criteria for the latter are based primarily
on present life circumstances (e.g., the family structure, age, or health of the claimant)
and financial need. See BRUDNo, supra note 1, at 514-16.
2. See generally O'Neil, Of Justice Delayed and Justice Denied: The Welfare
Prior Hearing Case, 1970 Sup. Cr. REv. 161; Comment, The Constitutional Minimum
for the Termination of Welfare Benefits: The Need for and Requirements of a Prior
Hearing, 68 MICH. L. REv. 112 (1969). Compare the "entitlement" approaches advocated by Sparer, The Role of the Welfare Client's Lawyer, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 361,
362-65 (1965), and Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 768-87 (1964), with
the critique of the "entitlement" approach, insofar as it relies on procedural safeguards
typical of the traditional adversary model to provide a rule of law for welfare recipients, comparable to that enjoyed by the owners of property in its more traditional form,
by Handler, ControllingOfficial Behavior in Welfare Administration, 54 CALIF. L. REv.
479, 480-500 (1966).
3. See ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, bk. VI, ch. 8, in THE BASIC WORKS OF
ARISTOTLE 1029-30 (R. McKeon ed. 1941); cf. ARISTOTLE, Politics, bk. VII, chs. 13, in id., at 1277-82.
4. "'Due Process' is an elusive concept. Its exact boundaries are undefinable,
and its content varies according to specific factual contexts. Thus, when governmental
agencies adjudicate or make binding determinations which directly affect the legal
rights of individuals, it is imperative that those agencies use the procedures which have
traditionally been associated with the judicial process . . . . [Dlue process embodies
the differing rules of fair play, which through the years, have become associated with
differing types of proceedings. Whether the Constitution requires that a particular
[procedural] right obtain in a specific proceeding depends upon a complexity of factors.
The nature of the alleged right involved, the nature of the proceeding, and the possible
burden on that proceeding, are all considerations which must be taken into account."
Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960). See also Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306 (1950); cf. Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954, 954-60 (1971)
(Black, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87
HARv. L. REv. 55. 64 & n.42 (1973).
The phrase "safeguards of procedural due process" is intended to include, in addition to the basic requirements of notice and a (fairly structured) hearing, other procedural safeguards more specifically guaranteed by, e.g., the Fourth Amendment's
search and seizure requirements, which are incorporated within the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause and which perform similar functions in the context of an
individual facing a government bureaucracy which dispenses benefits on which that in-
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for welfare claimants.
Before proceeding to analyze these two issues, a brief description
of the terms "welfare claimant" and "welfare law" is necessary. As
here used, the designation "welfare claimant" includes first, initial applicants and second, current recipients facing: (a) complete termination; (b) reduction in the dollar amount of assistance; (c) loss of or
exclusion from nonfinancial or "income-in-kind 5 assistance (for example, access to job-training programs, child care, rent subsidies, food
stamps); and, (d) imposition of additional conditions on continued eligibility (for example, cooperation with or acquiescence in "home visits" by welfare caseworkers which are conducted outside the strictures
of the Fourth Amendment's search and seizure safeguards). 6
The term "welfare law," as used here, includes both those direct
cash transfer programs typically referred to as "welfare"-the categorical assistance programs (Old-Age Assistance [OAA], Aid to the Blind
[AB], Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled [APTD], and
Aid to Families with Dependent Children [AFDE]), established by
the 1935 federal Social Security Act--as well as those direct cash
dividual is dependent-the welfare bureaucracy obviously being the classic case. Cf.
Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 276-81, 486 P.2d 1242, 1255-59, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42,
55-59 (1971), relying on Sniadach's Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process
approach in striking down California's claim and delivery procedures, as violative of
the Fourth Amendment.
5. "Income-in-kind" income redistribution programs transfer specific goods or
services for little or no cost, or provide subsidy payments to purchase or be reimbursed
for the cost of specific goods or services. For a discussion of the reasons for preferring
such programs over direct cash transfer programs for at least some income redistribution purposes, e.g., redistributing wealth within the society so as to more extensively
provide housing for those with insufficient income to (adequately) house themselves,
see INCOME MAuNrENANCE, supra note 1, at 127-28. For a comparison of "incomein-kind" programs with direct cash transfer programs see note 1 supra. See generally
BRWDNo, supra note 1, at 529-92.
6. See Wyman v. James, 400 U.s. 309 (1971). This case, although it specifically focuses on the Fourth Amendments search and seizure provisions, is included
as a particular example of the procedural safeguards to which welfare claimants are,
or are not, entitled in their dealings with the welfare bureaucracy, for the reasons discussed in the text accompanying notes 19-20 infra, as well as for the reason given in
the last paragraph of note 4 supra.
7. Ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935). See BRUDNO, supra note 1, at 511-13. As of
January 1, 1974, the three adult categories (OAA, AB, and ATTD) are combined
into one program; the Supplemental Security Income for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled
Program, act of October 30, 1972 Public Law No. 92-603, section 301, 86 Stat. 1465.
This program provides a federal floor and federal administration of both the basic
federal grant and any optional state supplemental grants. If the state chooses federal
over state and local administration, for which there is a financial incentive. The
basic eligibility requirements remain the same, except for eligibility criteria such as
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transfer programs called "insurance" programs-Unemployment Insurance and Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI),
generally called "Social Security."
The two major types of issues underlying the procedural due
process debate in welfare law-the constitutional-doctrinal type and
the political wisdom type-differ in that they raise, or focus upon, two
fundamentally disparate questions. The first, the constitutional-doctrinal type of issue, asks: What do the relevant case law precedents,
the trends and changes in the way the United States Supreme Court8
has interpreted and applied the constitutional provision at issue, and
the legal-social policies underlying those constitutional adjudications,
tell us about, or how can they be utilized to obtain, the constitutional
safeguards to which a welfare claimant is, or should be, entitled? The
second, the political wisdom type of issue, asks, on the other hand:
Will providing procedural due process or other constitutional safeguards in fact matter for the individual welfare claimant; that is, will
it provide greater financial security or enhanced personal dignity? In
more collective terms, will providing such safeguards for welfare claimants ultimately improve the welfare system (including alleviating poverty in general) from the vantage point of either welfare claimants
generally or society at large? And, finally, assuming that the answer
to either of these latter two questions is affirmative, will the benefits
to be gained justify the cost of implementation?
The most fruitful way to understand and evaluate the case law
of procedural due process for welfare claimants is to recognize that
the first type of issue is decided on the basis of considerations of the
second type. That is, as the following discussion of the United States
ownership, limitation and recruitment provisions, which heretofore varied considerably
among the several states. For a comprehensive critical summary of the new federal
adult categorical assistance program, see Recent Developments, Welfare Law-1972
Social Security Act Amendment-Supplemental Income for the Aged, Blind, and
Disabled, 58 CORNELL L. REv. 803 (1973).

8. Discussion here is limited to the major procedural due process decisions of
the United States Supreme Court. Decisions of lower federal courts and of state courts
are not included. At the time of the Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), decision
only Chief Justice Burger, among the four Nixon appointees, was on the Court. Justice
Blackmun was on the Court during the entire period in which the four post-Goldberg

decisions were decided, and, by the time of the Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656
(1973), decision, all four Nixon appointees were on the Court. The crucial shift in
the composition of the Court which resulted in what I here refer to as the "Burger
Court majority" in welfare procedural cases occurred when Justice Blackmun joined
Chief Justice Burger on the Court. Three of the four remaining members of the Goldberg majority-Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall-then became the minority, and,

with the one exception of Justice Stewart's vote in Ortwein, see text accompanying
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Supreme Court's five major decisions in this area will demonstrate,
the doctrinal resolutions of the constitutional issues are, in large part,
phrased in terms of and justified on the basis of arguments which fall
into the political wisdom category. This is equally true of the first
and leading case, Goldberg v. Kelly, 9 which held basic procedural due
process safeguards applicable to loss of welfare benefits, and of the
subsequent Burger Court majority decisions which eroded that hold10
mg.
The demise of procedural due process for welfare claimants is
best illustrated by considering four post-Goldberg decisions by the
Burger Court majority. (1) Richardson v. Perales,1 1 authored by Justice Blackmun, held that a hearsay physician's medical report was sufficient evidence to support an administrative finding of nondisability,
and, therefore, ineligibility, 12 even where the claimant objects to the
admissibility of the report, alleging denial of confrontation and crossnotes 17-19 infra, remain the only justices to consistently dissent from the Burger Court
majority's case-by-case erosion of Goldberg. Cf. The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87
Hmv. L. Plv. 55, 62 n.32 (1973).
9. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
10. See the discussion of the growth and composition of the "Burger Court majority" in note 8 supra.
11. 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
12. Disability is defined as: "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which
can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for
a continuous period of not less than 12 months . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)
(1970). This definition, the most crucial factor upon which eligibility for disability
insurance depends, is narrowed by 42 U.S.C. § 423(d) (2) (A) (1970), which provides
that a claimant can be found disabled under subsection (1) (A) "only if his physical
or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable
to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experi.
ence, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he
lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired
if he applied for work" (emphasis added). For examples of decisions construing the
statutory definition of disability and its application to particular medical and vocational
facts, see Gentile v. Finch, 423 F.2d 244 (3d Cir. 1970); compare Stewart v. Cohen,
309 F. Supp. 949 (E.D.N.Y. 1970). See generally Note, ProceduralDue Process and
the Termination of Social Security Disability Benefits, 46 So. CAL. I. RaV. 1263, 126669 (1973).
Eligibility for disability insurance, which was not added to the OASDI program
until 1956 and which did not cover persons under 50 years old until 1960, also requires
that the claimant be insured within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 423(c) (1) (1970),
as well as being disabled within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 423(d) (1970). If the
claimant cannot establish the requisite "disability" or "insured status," then the only
income redistribution program which is potentially available, other than some form of
county administered and financed "general relief," is the APTD categorical assistance
program.
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examination of adverse witnesses' 8-which fights were included within
the due process procedural safeguards held minimally necessary in
Goldberg v. Kelly' 4 -and, where the only live testimony, including
that of other examining physicians, favors the claimant and conflicts with
the hearsay report. (2) Richardson v. Wright, 5 a per curiam, six-three
decision, refused to adjudicate the procedural rights of disability insurance recipients facing suspension or termination of benefits because
of a pending HEW regulation liberalizing the procedural rules governing Social Security Administration disability hearings. This holding
was contrary to the Goldberg Court's refusal to postpone such adjudication merely because of a pending HEW regulation enlarging the
procedural safeguards in termination of categorical assistance "fair
hearings."' 6 (3) Ortwein v. Schwab,' 7 another per curiam decision
like Wright, upheld a $25 filing fee for obtaining judicial review of
an adverse administrative finding, to which welfare claimants are statutorily entitled, against both procedural due process and First Amendment access-to-court challenges, even where the appellants are admittedly too poor to pay the fee. This decision, unlike Wright, had
only a five (rather than six) man majority, with Justice Stewart joining
the three dissenters, Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall, in
Wright'" and Wyman v. James.'9 (4) Wyman v. James, also authored
by Justice Blackmun, held that an AFDC mother is not entitled to
the procedural safeguards of the Fourth Amendment. The decision
upheld a New York law which conditioned eligibility for AFDC on
13. The court in Cohan v. Perales, 416 F.2d 1250, 1251 (5th Cir. 1969) held
"that mere uncorroborated hearsay evidence as to the physical condition of a claimant,
standing alone and without more, in a social security disability case tried before a hearing examiner . . . is not substantial evidence that will support a decision of the examiner adverse to the claimant, if the claimant objects to the hearsay evidence and
if the hearsay evidence is directly contradicted by the testimony of live medical witnesses and by claimant who [testifies] in person before the examiner, as was done
in the case at bar."
14. 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1969).
15. 405 U.S. 208 (1972).
16. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 259 n.3 (1969). The term "fair hearings" is a statutory term. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(4) (1970). Under HEW regulations in force at the time of the Goldberg decision, the statutory requirement that a
fair hearing be provided before a termination decision becomes final, 42 U.S.C.
§ 602(a)(4) (1970), was satisfied by a post-termination administrative hearing and
a full retroactive payment to those claimants who seek and obtain a favorable ruling,
reversal of the termination, from the "fair hearing." 397 U.S. at 260 n.6.
17. 410 U.S. 656 (1973); see The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HAv. L. REv.
56, 57 n.3 (1973).
18. 405 U.S. at 209-27.
19. 400 U.S. at 326-47.
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the adult recipient's allowing "home visits" by welfare caseworkers
who, in most instances, had no reason to believe either that there was
any welfare fraud, or that there was anything about the home which
would make it harmful for the AFDC children in the family, but who
nonetheless were required to report any evidence of welfare fraud to
their superiors.
Although Wyman v. James"' technically is not a due process decision, but rather a Fourth Amendment decision, discussion of this case
is included because it is an extremely important and clear example
both of the doctrinal differences between the Goldberg Court majority
and the Burger Court majority in the four post-Goldberg cases, and,
most importantly, of the diffferences in how the majority of each Court
views welfare claimants, welfare officials, and the beneficence of governmental bureaucracies in general. This change in attitude, occasioned by the post-Goldberg shift in the composition of the majority
in welfare procedural cases, toward welfare recipients, welfare officials, and the welfare system in general, is typified by Justice Blackmun's opinion in James. And, it is this attitudinal change which is
the major explanation for the erosion of the doctrinal and underlying
policy approach of Goldberg.
One reason why this attitudinal change and resulting doctrinal
erosion are particularly clear in James is the unusual line-up of the
parties before the Supreme Court in that case. The local Social Service
Employees Union submitted an amicus brief on behalf of Mrs. James,
the AFDC recipient. In that brief the welfare caseworkers argued
that the home visit rule should be held unconstitutional because their
understaffing, rapid turnover, and burdensome caseloads made it impossible to achieve the rehabilitative purposes which allegedly justified
excluding the home visit from the probable cause and warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment.21 What may be even more unusual
about the posture of the Court in James, is the way in which Justice
Blackmun treats the arguments of the welfare caseworkers. In effect,
Justice Blackmun refuses to believe that those who administer the
home visit rule have a better understanding of the way in which it
operates than he does. Armed with his own view of the welfare system, of those who administer it, and of those who are dependent upon
it, Justice Blackmun refuses to follow the time-honored, well-estab20. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
21. The amicus brief submitted on behalf of the welfare caseworkers in James
is excerpted in BRUDNO, supra note 1, at 988-93. See text accompanying notes 17779 infra.
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lished principle that in construing state administrative regulations, the
Supreme Court should give great deference to the interpretation of
those who administer it. James, as will be discussed in more detail
below, is thus one of the clearest examples of why the doctrinal stance
and underlying political philosophy of Goldberg no longer holds sway
with a majority of the Burger Court when passing upon the constitutionality of the procedures utilized, and the conditions imposed upon
recipients, by the welfare bureaucracy.
The Constitutional-Doctrinal Debate
The underlying doctrinal debate in the Supreme Court decisions

adjudicating the extent to which welfare claimants are entitled to pro-

cedural safeguards revolves around the apporpriate role, if any, of the
"right-privilege" distinction.2 2 This distinction derives from an aphor-

ism of Justice Holmes to the effect that, while a policeman may have
a right to engage in political speech, he certainly has no right to be

a (government-paid) policeman. 23

The "right-privilege" distinction

was theoretically rejected by the Court in 1960, in Flemming v. Nes-

tor,24 which involved the constitutionality of conditioning eligibility for

Old Age and Survivor's Insurance on nonmembership in the Communist Party.2 5 This distinction was expressly rejected by Justice Brennan,
22. "The most inviting distinction in the field of government benefits is the one
that has been drawn between rights and privileges. Those who start with this distinction then conclude that a privilege, being a mere government gratuity, can be conditioned without limit because it could be withdrawn without notice or formal proceeding.
'Rights,' on the other hand, have to be treated circumspectly because they are in some
sense 'vested,' and cannot be summarily withdrawn or arbitrarily denied. The distinction is circular as well as illusory." O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare
Benefits with Strings Attached, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 443, 445 (1966). For an analysis
of the rise and arguably impending fall of the doctrine see Van Alstyne, The Demise
of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. Rnv. 1439
(1968). See generally BRUDNO, supra note 1, at 611-33; R. O'NEiL, THE PRIcE OF
DEPENDENCY ch. II; French, Unconstitutional Conditions: An Analysis, 50 GEo. L.J.
234 (1961); Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 COLUm.
L. RFv. 321 (1935); Linde, Constitutional Rights in the Public Sector: Justice Douglas on Liberty in the Welfare State, 40 WASH. L. REv. 10 (1965); Powell, The Right
to Work for the State, 16 COLUM. L. Ruv. 99 (1916); Reich, Individual Rights and
Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965); Willcox, Invasions of the First Amendment Through Conditioned Public Spending, 41 CORNELL L.Q.
12 (1955); Note, UnconstitutionalConditions, 73 HARv. L. RFv. 1959 (1960).
23. "[The officer might] have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has
no constitutional right to be a policeman." McAuliffe v. Mayor and Bd. of Alderman,
155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
24. 363 U.S. 603 (1960). See BRUDNO, supranote 1, at 602-16.
25. "The challenged section . . .provides for the termination of old-age, survivor, and disability insurance benefits payable to . .. an alien individual who, after
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writing for the majority in Goldberg. As delineated by Justice Brennan, "[ihe constitutional issue to be decided . . . is the narrow one
whether the Due Process Clause requires that the [welfare claimant]
be afforded an evidentiary hearing before termination of benefits"; 26
and this issue "cannot be answered by an argument that public assistance benefits are a 'privilege' and not a 'right.' "217 That is, even
though one has no right to receive financial assistance from the government in the absence of any welfare program, 28 once the governSeptember 1, 1954 (the date of the enactment of the section), is deported [by reason
of] any one of certain grounds [including membership in the Communist Party] spedfied in [the challenged section here upheld]." 363 U.S. at 604-05. "We must conclude that a person covered by the [Social Security] Act has not such a right in
[OASDI] benefit payments [as] would make every defeasance of "accrued" interests
violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 611.
Justice Harlan, author of the majority opinion in Flemming, articulated the following standard of review on the basis of which Nestor's due process challenge was rejected: "Particularly when we deal with a withholding of a noncontractual benefit under a social welfare program such as this, we must recognize that the Due Process
Clause can be thought to interpose a bar only if the statute manifests a patently arbitrary classification, utterly lacking in rationale justification." Id. at 611 (emphasis
added).
Justice Harlan also rejected Nestor's arguments that the challenged section constituted an ex post facto law and a bill of attainder. Id. at 612-21. Contra, id. at 62128 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Keyishian v. Board
of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), held that the standard established in Scales v. United
States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961), for the kind of political membership which can be criminally sanctioned consistently with the First Amendment, applies to determine the constitutionality of conditions on public employment (in Keyishian, faculty positions at
a state university) which regulate the political association of the employee. The basic
principle of Keyishian, under which the First Amendment tests for criminal sanctions
on speech and assembly apply to determine the constitutionality of conditions imposed
on eligibility for government benefits, regardless of their classification as rights or privileges, was recently re-affirmed in Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). But see
United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548
(1973), upholding the constitutionality of § 9(a) of the Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. §
7324(a) (1970), which prohibits federal employees from taking an "active part in political management or in political campaigns," and thus re-affirming the basic holding
of United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947), which up until then ap.
peared to be undermined completely by the Keyishian principle. The 1973 decision
upholding the Hatch Act, like all the post-Goldberg decisions here discussed, with the
exception of Ortwein, see text accompanying notes 17-19 supra, was a six-three decision, the majority consisting of all four Nixon appointees plus Justices Stewart and
White (the author of the majority opinion). See generally The Supreme Court, 1972
Term, 87 HARv. L. Rnv. 55, 141-53 (1973).
26. 397 U.S. at 260.
27. Id. at 262.
28. See the discussion in BRUDNO, supra note 1, at 631-39, of the ambiguity of
the term "right" as utilized by advocates of the "entitlement" theory of government
largesse, e.g., Jones, The Rule of Law and the Welfare State, 58 COLUM. L. Ruv. 143,
154-55 (1958); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.. 733, 785-87 (1964); Sparer,
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ment sets up a welfare program it cannot do so on any conditions it
chooses. In particular, it cannot impose conditions on receipt of its
benefits if the conditions are such that their imposition on citizens generally would violate the Constitution.
The Justices' attitude toward the "right-privilege" distinction determines, to a large degree, the standard of review which is applied
to resolve the constitutional-doctrinal issue at stake, as well as the
threshold issue of whether to review the constitutionality of the challenged administrative rule at all. That there is a one-to-one correlation between this attitude and the standard of review applied or the
outcome of the decision to review at all, is made clear by comparing
the standard adopted in Goldberg, with the standards utilized by the
Burger Court majority in Perales, Ortwein, and James; and, by comparing the Goldberg Court's judicial review posture with the no-review
decision in Wright. As pointed out by Justices Douglas29 and Marshall3 ° in their dissents in James, the "right-privilege" distinction has
been resurrected, in effect, so that the reasonableness, or the "any
rational basis" test of Flemming v. Nestor3 1 again prevails. This
standard of review, which is the same standard developed by the Court
in the post-1935 economic regulation cases,32 is in sharp contrast to
The Role of the Welfare Client's Lawyer, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 361, 362-65 (1965),

and the two different, but never delineated nor distinguished, meanings of the terms
"right" and "entitlement." That there are two different but nondifferentiated concepts
operative here is the most readily perceivable in Professor Reich's discussion of "entitlement" in Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE
L.J. 1245, 1255-56 (1965). In this article, as pointed out in BRUDNO, supra note 1,

at 637-38: "[Clompressed into the term 'entitlement' are two very different notions
of legal right. The first is the statutory right concept discussed above [at 631-33,
which is, basically, as summarized at 633, 'that the acquisition rules for government
largess should assimilate those for private property' in terms of the rules' (1) substan-

tive objectivity, (2) susceptibility to additional conditions, and (3) administrative procedures, so that practically and legally speaking, 'the interest of one who satisfies the
eligibility criteria for a given form of largess would be a matter of right in the same
way in which the private property owner's is.'] The [second] notion, which rests on
the same normative and structural premies, is that rights to certain forms of largess
are prior to, rather than dependent upon, a statutory scheme dispensing that largess.

That an individual has a right or is entitled to such largess means that society is under
an affirmative obligation to provide it.

[With this second notion, unlike the first-

the statutory right-notion, then,] the issue .. . is not removal of restraints [on the
recipient of the largess,] but provision of the necessities of life without which liberty
is impossible."
29. See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 326-37 (Douglas, J.,dissenting).

30.

See id., at 338-47 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

31. 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960). See note 25 supra.
32. See McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT.RaV. 34, 36-40. See also Karst, Invidious Discrim-
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that adopted in Goldberg:
The extent to which procedural due process must be afforded the
[welfare claimant facing termination of benefits] is influenced by
the extent to which he [or she] may be "condemned to suffer
grievous loss" . . . and depends upon whether the recipient's interest in avoiding that 33loss outweighs the governmental interest in
summary adjudication.
The Goldberg Court's standard, unlike the Flemming reasonableness test which implies a presumption of constitutionality, places the
burden of proof on the government. Moreover, in balancing the competing interests under this standard, Justice Brennan finds a governmental interest in common with that of the welfare claimant. He argues that providing welfare assistance to those unable to support themselves serves the interest not only of the individual recipients, but also
of the government and society generally. He then argues that "[t]he
same governmental interest that counsel the provision of welfare,
counsel as well its uninterrupted provision to those eligible to receive
it; pretermination evidentiary hearings are indispensable to that
end."' 34 The governmental interest which conflicts with that of the
recipient, on the other hand, is primarily that of conserving fiscal and
administrative resources. Given the grievous loss which an eligible
recipient may suffer if benefits are terminated prior to a hearing, along
with the governmental interest which is furthered by providing due
process safeguards for welfare claimants, the government's interest in
preserving fiscal and administrative resources can never be overriding
in the welfare context under the Goldbergbalancing standard.35
The standard of review adopted in Goldberg applies to the issue
of the nature of the notice and hearing required by the due process
clause, as well as to the threshold issue of whether a pretermination
hearing with notice is necessary at all. Applying that standard to the
former issue, the Goldberg majority holds that the pre-termination
ination: Justice Douglas and the Return of the "Natural-Law-Due-ProcessFormula",
16 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 716 (1969). The Flemming Court's adoption of the standard of
review developed in the post-1935 substantive-due-process-economic-regulation cases is
discussed in BRTDNO, supra note 1, at 614-15.

33. 397 U.S. at 262-63. Compare Goldberg's balancing test with that proposed
by Justice Marshall dissenting in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 521 (1970);
contrast the standards adopted by the majority (per Justice Stewart) in Dandridge,supra,
397 U.S. at 485-86. See note 52, infra, and accompanying text.
34. Id. at 265. See text accompanying notes 76-78 infra.
35. "Thus, the interest of the eligible recipient in uninterrupted receipt of public
assistance, coupled with the State's interest that his payments not be erroneously terminated, clearly outweighs the State's competing concern to prevent any increase in its
fiscal and administrative burdens." Id. at 266.
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hearing need not take the form of judicial, or quasi-judicial, trial. Instead, what is required are the minimum procedural safeguards,
adapted to the particular characteristics of welfare recipients, which
best serve the function of a pre-termination hearing. The function
of such a hearing is "to produce an initial determination of the validity
of the welfare department's grounds for discontinuance of payments
in order to protect a recipient against an erroneous termination of
his benefits." 3' 6 The minimum procedural safeguards necessary to
perform this function include the requirements that the pre-termination hearing be held at a meaningful time, in a meaningful manner,
and that a recipient have timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for a proposed termination, an effective opportunity to defend by
confronting any adverse witnesses, and the right to present the recipient's own arguments and any evidence orally, rather than merely in
writing. The guarantee of oral presentation of evidence is one of the
minimal procedural safeguards required by due process because
[w]ritten submissions are an unrealistic option for most recipients, who lack the educational attainment necessary to write effectively and who cannot obtain professional assistance. Moreover,
written submissions do not afford the flexibility of oral presentations . .

.

. Particularly where credibility and veracity are at is-

sue, as they must be in many termination proceedings, written submissions are a wholly unsatisfactory basis for decision. The second-hand presentation to the decisionmaker by the caseworker has
its own deficiencies; since the caseworker usually gathers the facts
upon which the charge of ineligibility rests, the presentation of the
recipient's side of the controversy cannot safely be left to him.
Therefore a recipient must be allowed to state his position orally. 37
Finally, Goldberg requires as the last minimally necessary procedural safeguard, that
[T]he decision maker's conclusion as to a recipient's eligibility
must rest solely on the legal rules and evidence adduced at the
hearing . .

.

. To demonstrate compliance with this elementary

requirement, the decision maker should state the reasons for his
determination and indicate the evidence he relied on . . .though

his statement need not amount to a full opinion or even formal
findings of fact and conclusions 38
of law. And, of course, an impartial decision maker is essential.
In Richardson v. Perales, 9 the Court purports both to apply the
36. Id. at 267.
37. Id. at 269. See also note 41 infra.
38. Id.at 271.
39. 402 U.S. 389, 401-02, 406-07 (1971). See generally Note, Procedural Due
Process and the Termination of Social Security Disability Benefits, 46 So. CAL. L. REv.
1263, 1296-1301 (1973).
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due process standard of Goldberg and to distinguish the two cases.
In holding that the denial of disability insurance eligibility solely on
the basis of a hearsay medical report contrary to the live medical testimony at the hearing does not deny the claimant due process of law,
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, distinguishes Goldberg on

several grounds.

First of all, Justice Blackmun says that this case,

unlike Goldberg, does not involve termination of benefits. 40 Secondly, this case, unlike Goldberg, does not involve a change of status

without notice, since the claimant had in fact been given notice and
also was represented by an attorney at the administrative hearing.
And, thirdly, apparently on the basis of his unqualified belief in the
competency and honesty of doctors, especially when compared with
welfare caseworkers and hearing officers, Justice Blackmun asserts:
[t]he specter of questionable credibility and veracity is not present [as it was in the welfare context in Goldberg]; there is professional disagreement with the medical conclusions, to be sure,
but4 there
is no attack here upon the doctor's credibility or verac1
ity.

40. See 402 U.S. at 406-07.

Chief Justice Burger in his dissent in Goldberg

stated: "Aside from the administrative morass that today's decision could well create,
the Court should also be cognizant of the legal precedent it may be setting. The ma-

jority holding raises intriguing possibilities concerning the right to a hearing at other
stages in the welfare process ....
[Dloes the Court's holding embrace welfare reductions or denial of increases as opposed to terminations, or decisions concerning initial applications or requests for special assistance? The Court supplies no distinguishble considerations and leaves these crucial questions unanswered." Id. at 284-85.
Compare the attitude of Chief Justice Burger, id., and that of Justice Blackmun in
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971), as to the distinction between (a) termination of welfare benefits, and (b) other administrative decisions on changes in the amount
and/or kinds of welfare benefits and on initial eligibility, with judicial decisions on
the constitutionally required procedural safeguards for public housing administrative decisions. In this latter area, courts have required prior notice and a hearing at which
the aggrieved tenant or applicant can contest rent increases, Burr v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority, 347 F. Supp. 1202 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), and denials of admission, Neddo v. Housing Authority, 335 F. Supp. 1397 (E.D. Wis. 1971), as well as
evictions, Caulder v. Durham Housing Authority, 433 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 1003 (1971); Rscalera v. New York City Housing Authority, 425
F.2d 853 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970). See also Note, Procedural
Due Process in Government-Subsidized Housing, 86 HAv. L. Rav. 880, 880-81 & nn.47 (1973).
41. Id. at 407. Justice Blackmun's explicit reliance on the good faith and competency of the medical profession, so obvious, and so obviously unexplained in Perales,
also accounts in large part for his decision, as well as the tenor of his majority opinion, in the abortion cases, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton,
410 U.S. 179 (1973). However, compare his attitude toward the honesty and compe.
tency of welfare caseworkers in his majority opinion in Wyman v. Jones, 400 U.S.
309, 322-23 & n.1.
See text accompanying notes 170-77 and 181-82 infra. Apparently, then, the difference between the administrative context in Goldberg and that in
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The fourth way, and in my view the only sensible way, in which
Goldberg is distinguishable from Perales, is on the basis of the particular facts in Perales. The claimant in Perales failed to exercise a statutory right to subpoena the doctor who wrote the adverse medical report; and, most importantly in this context, the claimant was represented by an attorney, although this latter fact does not appear to be
stressed by the majojrity. 42 Goldberg, therefore, can be distinguished
from Perales very easily because the Perales claimant had legal representation at the hearing and notice of the hearing was provided in
a reasonable manner and amount of time. Thus the claimant in Perales in effect waived his right to have a decision based on evidence
stronger than that of the one hearsay medical report, even in the context of this case where all the live testimony supported the claimant.
However, it is not at all clear from Justice Blackmun's opinion that
this distinguishing waiver factor is decisive, especially when considered
in light of his emphatic confidence in the reliability of doctors comPerales and Wright, at least for Justice Blackmun and the other three Nixon appointees
and Justices Stewart and White who joined his opinion in Perales and the per curiam
opinion in Wright, is due to the difference in reliability of doctors and welfare caseworkers!
Justice Blackmun emphasized the assumed lack of credibility and veracity problems in the disability insurance administrative context, as compared with the Goldberg
majority's assumption of the presence of such problems in the welfare categorical assistance administrative context. See 397 U.S. 254, 269; see text accompanying note 37
supra. This assumption in Goldberg should be compared with Justice Brennan's "empirical observation" of the presence of such problems in Richardson v. Wright, 405
U.S. 208, 221 (1972) (quoted below).
Moreover, Justice Blackmun also relies on the over-all "fairness of the system"
in Perales, which he believes is attested to by the 44.2 percent reversal rate for all
federal disability hearings in cases in which the prior state administrative decision has
rejected the applicant's claim of eligibility. See 402 U.S. at 410.
Statistics such as reversal rate percentages, however, can be used to demonstrate
the absence, as well as the presence, of "fairness of the system." Justice Brennan,
dissenting in Richardson v. Wright, 405 U.S. 208, 211 (1972) argues: "Finally, the
post-termination reversal rate for disability [insurance] determinations makes the asserted 'objectivity' [claim of the HEW Secretary-namely, that disability insurance
benefits are discontinued 'only on the basis of an objective consideration-that the previous disability has ceased-and that conclusion rests on reliable information.' Id. at
219] even more doubtful. According to the Secretary's figures for 1971, 37% of the
requests for reconsideration resulted in reversal of the determination that disability had
ceased. Moreover, 55% of the beneficiaries who exercised their right to a hearing won
reversal. While as the Secretary says, these figures may attest to the fairness of the
system, Richardson v. Perales, supra, at 410, they also appear to confirm that the
Court's reference in Goldberg to 'the welfare bureaucracy's difficulties in reaching correct decisions on eligibility,' 397 U.S. at 264 n.12, is fully applicable to the administration of the disability program."
42. See 402 U.S. at 395-97, 404-05.
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pared to that of welfare caseworkers.
The uncertainty of the importance in Perales of the waiver factor,
as a way of distinguishing Goldberg, is based primarily on both the
standard of review applied to delineate the minimal procedural safeguards required by due process, and also on the various nondoctrinal
reasons, such as the absence of credibility and veracity problems with

medical evidence, given for requiring fewer procedural safeguards
here than in Goldberg. Thus, for example, in rejecting the claimant's

arguments that the use of medical advisers in the disability hearing,
and the lack of a truly independent hearing examiner, deny due process,43 in addition to the alleged denial of due process created by the

reliance on hearsay, Justice Blackmun responds: "The matter comes
down to the question of the procedure's integrity and fundamental fair-

ness.

44

Insofar as Richardson v. Perales adopts a "fundamental fairness"

test for determining the procedural safeguards required by the due
process clause in a disability insurance eligibility hearing, it constitutes
a substantial departure from the balancing standard adopted in Gold-

berg. Despite the fact that we are here dealing with "insurance"
benefits, which are in some sense "earned," unlike the categorical assistance benefits involved in Goldberg, which are based primarily on

financial need rather than past earnings,45 the standard adopted in Perales gives less protection to the claimant than does Goldberg. This
"fundamental fairness" test was developed by those Justices who, like
43. Id. at 408-10.
44. Id. at 410.
45. On the differences between social insurance and public assistance, or welfare,
income redistribution programs, see BRUDNo, supra note 1, at 514-17, 521-28, for both
the economic-political distinctions, summarized in note 1 supra, and also the psychological distinctions, especially in terms of the differences in attitudes of both the general public and legislators toward social insurance recipients compared to their attitudes
toward those dependent on public assistance. See also tenBroek & Wilson, Public Assistance and Social Insurance-A Normative Evaluation, 1 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 237, 244
(1954), cf., Diamond, The Children of Leviathan: Psychoanalytic Speculations Concerning Welfare Law and Punitive Sanctions, 54 CP.LW. L. REv. 357 (1966); P. Jacobs,
Ameriecs Schizophrenic View of the Poor, in PovERTr: VmEws FROM Tim LEsT 3957 (J.Lamer & I. Howe eds. 1968). Paul Jacobs states that "[alan ideological schizophrenia with a complex history characterizes the American view of poverty. On the
one hand, we believe achievement is related primarily to self-reliance and self-help; on
the other, we have been forced to concede that failure cannot always be laid at the
door of the individual." Id. at 39-40. Compare Jacobs' characterization of the typical
American attitudes toward, or schizophrenia about, poverty, id., with Justice Brennan's
statement in Goldberg that "[w]e have come to recognize that forces not within the
control of the poor contribute to their poverty." 397 U.S. at 265. See text accompanying notes 76 and 107 infra.
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the late Justice Harlan, author of the majority decision in Flemming
v. Nestor,4 6 believed in a very limited scope of judicial review. Its
readoption in Perales signals a return to the reasonableness approach,
which puts a very heavy burden on the claimant challenging the constitutionality of bureaucratic procedures, and thereby constitutes a substantial erosion of Goldberg.
The other aspect of the Perales majority opinion which indicates
a substantial erosion of the doctrines developed in Goldberg, are the
nondoctrinal, political-institutional reasons given to support the Perales
majority's attitude that very few judicial-type procedural safeguards are
necessary or desirable in Social Security Administration hearings."
This will be discussed further below.
Another possible reason for the Court's departure from the Goldberg approach in Perales is the typical judicial linedrawing concern,
which is exemplified by Justice Black's dissent in Goldberg, although
it is nowhere expressly articulared in Perales. Dissenting in Goldberg,
Justice Black argues:
[T]he inevitable logic of the approach taken will lead to constitutionally imposed, time-consuming delays of a full adversary process of administrative and judicial review. In the next case the
welfare recipients are bound to argue that cutting off benefits before judicial review of the agency's decision is also a denial of
due process. Since, by hypothesis, termination of aid at that point
may still "deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which
to live while he waits," ante, at 264, I would be surprised if the
weighing process did not compel the conclusion that termination
without full judicial review would be unconscionable. After all,
at each step, as the majority seems to feel, the issue is only one
of weighing the government's pocketbook against the actual survival of the recipient, and surely that balance must always tip in
favor of the individual. Similarly today's decision requires only
the opportunity to have the benefit of counsel at the administrative hearing, but it is difficult to believe that the same reasoning
process would not require the appointment of counsel, for otherwise the right to counsel is a meaningless one since these people
are too poor to hire their own advocates .

. .

. Thus the end

result of today's decision may well be that the government, once
it decides to give welfare benefits, cannot reverse that decision until the recipient has had the benefits of full administrative and
judicial review, including,
of course, the opportunity to present his
48
case to this Court.
Unfortunately, Justice Black in fact had very little to be concerned about. This is particularly evident in the 1973 per curiam de46. 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
47. See 402 U.S. at 400-01. See text accompanying note 150 infra.
48. 397 U.S. at 278-79 (Black, J., dissenting).
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cision in Ortwein v. Schwab,4 9 which upheld a $25 appellate court filing fee, the practical effect of which is to preclude welfare claimants
from obtaining judicial review of adverse administrative findings. The

way in which the Court in Ortwein distinguishes both Boddie v. Connecticut"° and Goldberg is another strong indication that the Burger

49. 410 U.S. 656 (1973).
50. 401 U.S. 371 (1971). Boddie held that requiring indigent plaintiffs to pay
filing fees and the cost of personal service of process, where the effect of the payment
requirements is to exclude bona fide indigents from obtaining a divorce sought in good
faith, deprives those plaintiffs of procedural due process, as if they were defendants
denied a meaningful opportunity to be heard before deprivation of a significant property interest. See id. at 376-79 & nn.3 & 5, 380-81, citing, Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (holding prejudgment wage garnishments violative of procedural due process).
Boddie does not make clear either (a) why the indigency must be bona fide and
the divorce sought in good faith or (b) how these bona fide and good faith qualifications are to be defined, let alone applied. Moreover, Boddie also leaves open the
extent of the class of plaintiffs who are sufficiently poor to have Boddie's access-tothe-divorce-courts protection. This is due in part to the fact that the individual plaintiffs and the class they represented were all welfare recipients, a class which obviously
is sufficiently poor. It is also due to much more general problems involved in wealth
discrimination cases. First, there is the problem of delineating who is poor and defining the meaning of poverty, including determining the type of assets and needs utilized
in measuring poverty and deciding who fits within the class of poor persons. Over and
above this typical judicial line-drawing problem is the question of deciding whether
or not these concepts should be relative, depending on the nature, or the "fundamentalness," of the interest at stake. See B. BRuDNo, CASES AND MATmUALs ON THE LAW
AND THE POOR 66A-D, 97C-G (4th ed. 1974) for a discussion of the poverty-class definitional problems in wealth discrimination cases. See generally S. MiLLER & P. ROBY,
THE FuTuRE OF INEQuALrrY (1970).
That "who is poor" and "what is (sufficiently severe) poverty" are relative concepts, depending upon the interest at stake, is at least implicit in Sniadach, where Justice Douglas emphasizes the importance of wages, 395 U.S. at 340-42. Compare id.
at 342-44 (Harlan, J., concurring), with Boddie, 401 U.S. at 376-77, where Justice Harlan emphasizes the importance of marriage and therefore the importance of divorce
since it is a precondition to re-marriage. That the interest at stake in Boddie is critical, at least for Justice Harlan and those justices who joined the majority opinion but
did not agree with the equal protection approach advocated by Justices Douglas, id.
at 383-86, and Brennan, id. at 388-89, stands out clearly in the majority opinion. The
"right to (re)marry" is emphasized both because of its doctrinal status and because
of its alleged sui generis institutional status. Its doctrinal status was first recognized
as a "fundamental right," see, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), but now
is considered a "constitutional" right under the due process-liberty clause. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 34 n.76 (1973); Roe v. Wade,
310 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). In Rodriguez the Court characterized the "right of procreation" involved in Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), the
progenitor of both Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (marital privacy)
and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to marry), as "among the rights
of personal privacy protected under the Constitution." 411 U.S. at 1297 n.76, citing Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Concerning the sui generis institutional status of the
"right to re-marry" the Boddie Court stated: "We know of no instance where two
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Court majority is moving, though not in words, back to the Flemming
v. Nestor approach. That approach in effect makes welfare benefits,
whether they be in the form of categorical assistance or social insurance, a "privilege" which may be provided on conditions and under
procedures which, if applied to interests more akin to private property,
would be held unconstitutional under the due process clause.
This "don't-press-your-luck-too-far" approach, contrary to the
fears expressed by Justice Black in his dissent in Goldberg, is that
of the majority in Ortwein. Viewing Ortwein as an adoption of this
approach for welfare procedural cases helps explain how the majority
can distinguish Boddie by characterizing a person's interest in welfare
as much less significant than a welfare recipient's desire to get a divorce. And it also explains, but by no means justifies, the Court's
distinguishing Boddie on the ground that the appellants in Ortwein
have apparently had one hearing, which comports with Goldberg:
In United States v. Kras . . .this Court upheld statutorily

imposed bankruptcy filing fees against a constitutional challenge
based on Boddie. We emphasized the special nature of the marital relationship and its concomitant associational interests, and
noted that they were not affected in that case and that the objective sought by appellant Kras could be obtained through alternative means that did not require a fee. Boddie, of course, was
not concerned with post-hearing review. We now conclude that
Kras, rather than Boddie, governs the present appeal ....
A. In Kras we observed that one's interest in a bankruptcy
discharge "does not rise to the same constitutional level" as one's
ability to dissolve his marriage except through the courts ....
In this case, appellants seek increased welfare payments. This
interest, like that of Kras, has far less constitutional significance
than the interest of the Boddie appellants ....
B. In Kras, the Court also stressed the existence of alternatives, not conditioned on the payment of the fees, to the judicial
remedy .

. .

.

The Court has held that procedural due process

requires that a welfare recipient be given a pretermination evidentiary hearing. [Citing Goldberg v. Kelley.] These appellants
have had hearings. The hearings provide a procedure, not condiconsenting adults may divorce and mutually liberate themselves from . . .the prohibition against remarriage, without invoking the State's judicial machinery." 401 U.S. at
376 (emphasis added). However, Justice Brennan, dissenting in Boddie stated: "A
State has an ultimate monopoly of all judicial process and attendant enforcement machinery. As a practical matter, if disputes cannot be successfully settled between the
parties, the court system is usually 'the only forum effectively empowered to settle their
disputes.'" 401 U.S. at 387 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
On the lack of realism, especially with respect to disputes involving the poor who
have no bargaining power, of Justice Harlan's sui generis characterization of divorce
litigation, see United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 454-56 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting); id. at 462-63 (Marshall, L, dissenting). See generally The Supreme Court,
1972 Term, 87 HARv. L. REv. 55, 57-67 (1973).
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tioned on payment of any fee, through which appellants have been
able to seek redress. This Court has long recognized that, even
in criminal cases, due process does not require a State to provide
an appellant system . . . . Under the facts of this case, appellants were not denied due process. 5 '
In rejecting appellants' equal protection claim in Ortwein, as well
52
as their due process claim, the Court cites Dandridge v. Williams.
Ortwein, like Dandridge, according to the Ortwein majority, essentially
involves an area of "economics and social welfare," and thus the "ap-

plicable standard [of review] is that of rational justification."'5 3
This combination of "one hearing is enough, even though it's an
administrative rather than a judicial proceeding," together with the re-

turn to the Flemming no-review standard, 54 indicates a significant retreat from the Goldberg balancing approach which places the burden
of justification on the government, rather than on the claimant alleging
a denial of due process or equal protection. Moreover, the Court in
Ortwein nowhere analyzes the State's interest in having the filing fee,
nor the importance of that interest. The only apparent reason for such
fees, other than the notion that they deter frivolous claims, is the
State's interest in conserving its judicial resources. Thus, Ortwein also
constitutes an overruling of, and not just a retreat from, at least one
of the most critical aspects of the Goldberg approach-namely, that
a state's interest in conservation of fiscal and administrative resources
51. 410 U.S. at 658-60.
52. 397 U.S. 471 (1970). Dandridge upheld the constitutionality of Maryland's
maximum-per-family grant system under which large families could receive only maximum AFDC benefit payments per month even though under the state's graduated
standard of need formula the AFDC family theoretically would be entitled to a larger
family allotment because of the presence of additional children. The result of the maximum grant system, upon which the equal protection challenge was based, is that children in larger families receive less AFDC benefits per capita than children in families
small enough to not be affected by the maximum grant amount. See text accompanying note 114 infra. The Dandridge majority, in an opinion authored by Justice Stewart, recognized that "public welfare assistance, by contrast [with businesses and industries, the regulation of which has been upheld under the no-review standard of the post1935 substantive due process cases] involves the most basic economic needs of impoverished human beings," and, that there is a "dramatically real factual difference," between cases involving business or industry regulations and the present case. 397 U.S.
at 485 (emphasis added). Despite this, the majority could "find no basis for applying
a different constitutional standard." Id. Therefore, since the Maryland maximumper-family grant rule can be viewed as a resources allocation (among the total number
of families eligible for AFDC) regulation, it is "in the area of economics and social
welfare," an area in which laws are held constitutional as long as their classifications
have some "reasonable basis." Id.
53. 410 U.S. at 660.
54. See note 25 supra.
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cannot, as a matter of law, constitute in and of itself a sufficiently
strong governmental interest to justify terminating or reducing55 wel-

fare benefits for reasons or under procedures which would not be constitutional if the claimant's interest at stake were more akin to either
private property as traditionally viewed, or to a "fundamental," and

now apparently constitutional, right such as the right to re-marry in
Boddie."
Finally, Ortwein is a rejection of the principle of Griffin v. Illinois."
In Griffin the court held that regardless of a state's freedom to refuse to
provide appellate review, even in criminal cases, once a state provides
such a procedure, it must provide it equally to all, including paying for
those appellate costs which would otherwise preclude an indigent from receiving appellate review at all. The rejection of this principle in Ortwein indicates a strong erosion, if not an implicit overruling, of Goldberg's rejection of the "right-privilege" distinction5" as a basis for adjudicating constitutional challenges to bureaucratic procedures59 for terminating, reducing60 or denying61 benefits which the government has
62
no affirmative obligation to provide.
Another example of the Burger Court majority's return to the
55. It is not clear whether Goldberg applies to reductions, denials of extra nonfinancial assistance, or denials of claimed deductions which also in effect constitute
reductions of the amount of assistance actually paid. See note 40 supra.
56. See the discussion of the doctrinal status of the right to re-marry in note
50 supra.
57. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
In Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 77 (1972) the
Court stated that: "When an appeal is afforded, however, it cannot be granted to some
litigants and capriciously or arbitrarily denied to others without violating the Equal
Protection Clause. [Citing, inter alia, Griffin v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 12 (1956)1."
See
generally Note on the Significance and Later Extensions of the Griffin Decision, in
B. BRUDNO, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW AND ThE POOR 23-38A (4th ed. 1974).
The Griffin principle has been applied in nonjudicial as well as noncriminal contexts.
See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966).
58. See text accompanying notes 22-24, and note 22 supra. See also note 2 supra.
59. But see Lindsey v. Normet, supra note 57, 405 U.S. 56, 77 (1972).
60. See note 40 supra.
61. Even though Chief Justice Burger in his dissent in Goldberg, see note 40
supra, lumps together the reduction and denial issues, the rationale of Goldberg, especially insofar as it focuses on the problem of "depriv[ing] an eligible recipient of
the very means by which to live while he waits" until the post-termination procedure
finally vindicates the recipient's claim of erroneous termination, see 397 U.S. at 264,
applies much more readily to reduction of an eligible recipient's welfare grant than
to an initial denial of eligibility. This is particularly true if the denial decision is made
at the first administrative level rather than on appeal from an initial decision favorable
to the welfare claimant. Cf. California Dep't of Human Resources Development v.
Java, 402 U.S. 121 (1971).
62. See BRUDNO, supra note 1, at 637-38, quoted in note 28 supra.
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philosophy of the "right-privilege" distinction, contrary to the doctrinal
stance of Goldberg, is the no-review decision by a six-three majority
in Richardson v. Wright."' In Wright, the Court had noted probable
jurisdiction"4 to consider the constitutionality, under Goldberg, of the
procedures for suspension and termination of disability insurance payments provided by the Social Security Act6 5 and the implementing regulations of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW).
Shortly before oral argument, the Court was advised by the Secretary
of HEW of the adoption of new regulations, effective December, 1971.
The new procedural regulations provide that a recipient be given notice of a proposed suspension or termination, including the reasons
therefore, plus an opportunity to submit rebuttal evidence. 6 No provision is made, however, to guarantee a recipient facing suspension
or termination the opportunity to appear personally at the Social Security Administration hearing, to present evidence orally, or to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. Thus, the new regulations
do not provide all of the procedural safeguards required in Goldberg
as minimally necessary under the due process clause. Despite these
deficiencies, the Court decided to remand the case without reviewing
the constitutionality of the new regulations, and without deciding
whether recipients facing termination or suspension of disability insurance payments should be treated differently than the categorical assistance recipients in Goldberg in regard to the extent to which they
are entitled to procedural safeguards under the due process clause.
In remanding the case, in one paragraph, per curiam decision, the
Court states:
In light of [the adoption of new regulations which include the
requirement that a recipient be given notice and the reasons for
a proposed suspension or termination, plus an opportunity to submit rebuttal evidence], we believe that the appropriate course is
to withhold judicial action pending reprocessing, under the new
regulations, of the determinations here in dispute. If that process
results in a determination of entitlement to disability benefits,
there will be no need to consider the constitutional claim that
claimants are entitled to an opportunity to make an oral presentation. In the context of a comprehensive complex administrative
program, the administrative process must have a reasonable opportunity to evolve procedures to meet needs as they arise.6r
63. 405 U.S. 208 (1972). See generally Note, Procedural Due Process and the
Termination of Social Security Disability Benefits, 46 So. CAL. L. REv. 1263, 128285 (1973).
64. 404 U.S. 819 (1971).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 425 (1970).
66. Richardson v. Wright, 405 U.S. 208, 209 (1972).
67. Id.
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The majority in Wright nowhere mentions, let alone explains, the
departure from Goldberg's contrary holding on the propriety of reviewing the constitutionality of termination procedures in the face of a
pending HEW regulation providing for greater procedural safeguards
for welfare claimants facing termination than those provided by the
regulations in effect at the time of the Goldberg litigation. Despite
the Court's silence in Wright on the inconsistency of its no-review decision with the Goldberg position on this issue, the Court in Wright,
in effect, has adopted sub silentio the position advocated by Chief Justice Burger in his dissent in Goldberg. He there argued:
The procedures for review of administrative action in the
"welfare" area are in a relatively early stage of development;
HEW has already taken the initiative by promulgating regulations
requiring that AFDC payments be continued until a final decision
after a "fair hearing" is held. [Footnote by the Court]6 8 . . .
Indeed, the HEW administrative regulations go far beyond the
results reached today since they require that recipients be given
the right to appointed counsel, a position expressly rejected by the
majority 69 . . ..
Against this background I am baffled as to why
we should engage in "legislating" via constitutional fiat when an
apparently reasonable result has been accomplished administratively.
That HEW has already adopted such regulations suggests to
me that we ought to hold the heavy hand of constitutional adjudication and allow evolutionary processes at various administrative
levels to develop . . . . I cannot accept-indeed I reject-any
notion that a government which pays out billions of dollars to
nearly nine million welfare recipients is heartless, insensitive, or
indifferent to the legitimate needs of the poor.
The Court's action today seems another manifestation of the
now familiar constitutionalizing syndrome: once some presumed
flaw is observed, the Court then eagerly
accepts the invitation to
find a constitutionally "rooted" remedy. 70
Despite the critical differences in the administrative-constitutional
posture of Goldberg and Wright-namely, that the pending HEW regulation governing procedures for terminating or suspending disability
68. "45 CFR § 205.10, 34 Fed. Reg. 1144 (1969)." 397 U.S. at 283 n.1 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See also Justice Brennan's discussion of this HEW regulation
pending at the time of the Goldberg decision, 397 U.S. at 257-58 n.3; id. at 260-61
n.6.
69. "We do not say that counsel must be provided at the pre-termination hearing,
but only that the recipient must be allowed to retain an attorney if he so desires ....
We do not anticipate that this assistance will unduly prolong or otherwise encumber
the hearing. Evidently HEW has reached the same conclusion. See 45 CFR § 205.10,
34 Fed. Reg. 1144 (1969); 45 CFR § 220.25, 34 Fed. Reg. 13595 (1969)." Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270-71 (1970).
70. 397 U.S. at 282-83 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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insurance benefits in Wright provided less protection than that mandated by the due process clause according to the Goldberg majoritythe only conceivable reason for the Court's refusal to decide the constitutional procedural issue in Wright is that given by Chief Justice Burger in his dissent in Goldberg quoted above. 1 The new Burger Court
majority, then, apparently feels that the most appropriate decisionmaking stance for the Court to take in welfare law cases in which
administrative procedures are challenged as insufficient under the due
process clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment, is to tailor its
decision to review or not to review the challenged procedures so that
administrative experimentation 72 and maximum administrative fairness73 is encouraged. This judicial attitude is clearly contrary to that
of the Goldberg majority's. 74
This conflict in attitudes toward judicial review underlies the contrary decisions in Wright and Goldberg on whether to review or not
to review the constitutionality of challenged administrative procedures.
This attitudinal difference rests on a difference in even more basic
views between the Goldberg and Wright majorities. It is a difference
of the "political wisdom" type, namely, the difference in views about
the nature of the welfare bureaucracy and the fairness of its procedures, as will be discussed further below. 5 This political wisdom type
of difference also underlies the contrary resolutions of the basic doctrinal dispute in the two cases, that is, whether welfare benefits should
be treated as a "privilege" which society bestows upon the "worthy
poor" out of charitable impulses, or as more akin to a "right" to which
those falling into the statutorily defined categories of eligible recipients
are entitled as is any other citizen who has a contractual or any other
more traditional type of legal claim enforceable against the government in its capacity as provider of government largesse. As long as
71. See text accompanying note 70 supra.
72. See Richardson v. Wright, 405 U.S. 208, 209 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 283-84 (1970) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); cf. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1,
27-28 (1964) (Harlan, I., dissenting); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 503-06
(1957) (Harlan, I., dissenting). See also Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 623
(1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting).

73. See note 2 supra.
74. See 397 U.S. at 257-58 & n.3.
75. See text accompanying notes 122-29, 161-82 infra. Compare Justice Brennan's attitude toward the meaning, in terms of the over-all fairness of the system and
its procedures, of the reversal rate statistics for disability insurance claimants initially
denied eligibility in Richardson v. Wright, 405 U.S. 208, 221 (1972) (Brennan, I., dissenting) with Justice Blackmun's interpretation of comparable statistics in his majority
opinion in Richardson v. Perales, 405 U.S. 389, 410 (1971). See note 41 supra.
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welfare benefits are treated primarily as a "privilege," as the majorities
in the post-Goldberg decisions appear to do, there need be no concern
that some recipients may be denied benefits to which they would
otherwise be entitled, while the Social Security Administration "experiments" with those procedures which It believes are the most appropriate, in terms of its own bureaucratic needs and resources, including
the amount of available money which it chooses to spend for provision
of procedural safeguards. This attitude, favoring bureaucratic experimentation over the immediate needs of those persons dependent upon
the benefits which the bureaucracy administers, is, needless to say,
the complete antithesis of the attitude of the Goldbergmajority:
[W]hen welfare is discontinued, only a pretermination evidentiary
hearing provides the recipient with procedural due process ...
For qualified recipients, welfare provides the means to obtain essential food, clothing, housing, and medical care. [Footnote by
the Court: "Administrative determination that a person is ineligible for participation in state-financed medical programs."] 76 Thus
the crucial factor in this context-a factor not present in the case of
the blacklisted government contractor, the discharged government
employee, the taxpayer denied a tax exemption, or virtually anyone
else whose governmental entitlements are ended-is that termination
of aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while
he waits. Since he lacks independent resources, his situation becomes immediately desperate. His need to concentrate upon finding the means for daily subsistence, in turn, adversely affects his
ability to seek redress from the welfare bureaucracy. [Footnote by
the Court: "His impaired adversary position is particularly telling
in light of the welfare bureaucracy's
difficulties in reaching correct
77
decisions on eligibility."]
Moreover, important governmental interests are promoted by
affording recipients a pretermination evidentiary hearing ...
We have come to recognize that forces not within the control of
the poor contribute to their poverty. .

.

.

Welfare, by meeting

the basic demands of subsistence, can help bring within the reach
of the poor the same opportunities that are available to others to
participate meaningfully in the life of the community. At the
same time, welfare guards against the societal malaise that may
flow from a widespread sense of unjustified frustration and insecurity. Public assistance, then, is not mere charity, but a means
to "promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity." The same governmental interests that counsel the provision of welfare, counsel as well its
76. 397 U.S. at 264 n.11. See BRUDNO, supra note 1, at 533-41 for eligibility
requirements for Medicaid, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-96g (1970). For the difference between
Medicaid and Medicare see BRUDNO, supra note 1, at 542.
77. 397 U.S. at 264-65 n.12. On the inherent nature of the chances of erroneous
decisions within the welfare bureaucracy, see Richardson v. Wright, 405 U.S. 208, 221
(1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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uninterrupted provision to those eligible to receive it; pre-termination evidentiary hearings are indispensable to that end 7 8
The Burger Court majority decision which constitutes the most
serious erosion of both the doctrinal and the underlying legal-political
policy aspects of Goldberg is Wyman v. James.79 In James, the six-three
majority, in another opinion authored by Justice Blackmun, explicitly
treats welfare as a "privilege":
One who dispenses purely private charity naturally has an
interest in and expects to know how his charitable funds are utilized and put to work. The public, when it is the provider, rightly
expects the same. It might well expect more, because of the trust

aspect of public funds.

....

80

In thus treating welfare-or at least public assistance like AFDCas a "privilege," James breaks with the long line of pre-Goldberg "unconstitutional conditions" decisions,8 which rejected Justice Holmes'
aphorism concerning the policeman who had a right to speak but no
82
rights with respect to his job.
Under the New York "home visit" law challenged as violative
of the Fourth Amendment in James, a welfare recipient (in this case
an AFDC mother) is required to submit to biannual visits by a welfare
caseworker in the recipient's home as a condition of both initial and
continued welfare eligibility. Most of these visits are preceded by
some form of notice, usually in writing, and occur during the day.
They are therefore not so clearly offensive as the midnight raids held
3
unconstitutional in Parrish v. Civil Service Commission.1
However,
the New York home visits are routinely required of all welfare recipients, without any distinction betwee( those recipients, on the one
hand, for whom there may be probable cause to believe that they are
engaged in some form of welfare fraud, or are maintaining a home
78. 397 U.S. at 264-65. See Paul Jacobs' "ideological schizophrenia" characterization of Americans' attitudes toward poverty and poor people in note 45 supra.
79. 400 U.S. 309 (1971). See generally Burt, Forcing Protection on Children
and Their Parents: The Impact of Wyman v. James, 69 Mica. L. REv. 1259 (1971).
80. 400 U.S. at 319 (emphasis added). For the view of Justice Marshall, id.
at 344-45, see text accompanying note 101 infra.
81. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 & n.6 (1969); Sherbert
v. Verer, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963). See also Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593,
597-98 (1972); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967); Speiser
v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958). See generally BRUDNo, supra note 1, at 61726. See notes 22 & 25 supra.
82. See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
83. 66 Cal. 2d 260, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1967). See BRuDNO, supra
note 1, at 620-22. The kind of raid involved in Parrish is apparently distinguished
in James, but not to the point of an explicit agreement with the case's Fourth Amendment holding. See 400 U.S. at 326.
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unsuitable for the children in the welfare family, and, on the other
hand, those welfare recipients for whom there is no reason to believe
that any form of home visit or other rehabilitative services are needed.
Thus, the only explanation for this lumping together of all AFDC recipients who are subject to the New York home visit requirement is
the paternalistic notion that anyone dependent on welfare necessarily
needs the type of assistance which a welfare caseworker theoretically
provides, even though no other citizen is expected to request, let alone
undergo, such assistance as a condition of receiving any other form
of government largesse. 4
Mrs. James, who was perfectly willing to go down to the welfare
office and discuss any questions a welfare official might have about
her continued eligibility, objected to the mandatory home visit on the
grounds that without either a warrant based on probable cause, or a
knowing, voluntary consent on her part, the home visit violated her
Fourth Amendment rights. She therefore refused to allow a welfare
caseworker into her home. As a result, her AFDC benefits were
terminated, even though there was no other basis for finding Mrs.
James ineligible. The majority, in rejecting Mrs. James' Fourth
Amendment contentions, argued that the home visit is not a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."' Furthermore, the
majority said that even if the visit is considered a search, such a search
without a warrant is not unreasonable,8 6 and, therefore, it does not
violate the Fourth Amendment rights of someone like Mrs. James.
Moreover, there is even a suggestion in Justice Blackmun's opinion
that by "choosing" AFDC, Mrs. James consented to the visit by waiving any Fourth Amendment rights she may otherwise have had.8
In discussing why the home visit, even if considered a search,
is not unreasonable and therefore not violative of the Fourth Amendment, Justice Blackmun discusses the significance of the means employed by the New York welfare bureaucracy and the individual caseworkers who actually carry out the home visits. Justice Blackmun
points out that at least with respect to Mrs. James and the particular
visit to which she refused to consent, that she received written notice,
84. See 400 U.S. at 332 (Douglas, J., dissenting). For excerpts of Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion see text accompanying note 137 infra. For excerpts of Justice

Marshall's dissenting opinion see text accompanying note 140 infra.
85. 400 U.S. at 317-18. Justice White, who concurred in the judgment and otherwise joined Justice Blackmun's majority opinion, expressly refused to join this particular part of the majority opinion. Id. at 326.
86.

Id. at 318.

87.

See id. at 324. See also text accompanying note 100 infra.
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several days in advance. 88 Furthermore, Justice Blackmun points out:
Privacy is emphasized. The applicant-recipient is made the primary source of information as to eligibility. Outside informational
sources, other than public records, are to be consulted only with
the beneficiary's consent. Forcible entry or entry under false pretenses or visitation outside working hours or snooping in the home
upon the
are forbidden. . . . All this minimizes any "burden"
home owner's right against unreasonable intrusion.8 9
Justice Blackmun's above statements about the privacy orientation
of the home visit are made in spite of his acknowledgment that the
record in the James case includes twelve affidavits, all of which contain
claims that the AFDC-recipient-affiant is subjected to home visits without notice in many cases; that when the caseworker does arrive, the
affiant's plans for that particular time cannot be carried out: that the
visit is, in the words of one affiant, "very embarrassing to me if the
caseworker comes when I have company"; and that the caseworker
"sometimes asks very personal questions" in front of the affiant's children.90 It is not clear whether Justice Blackmun disbelieves these
affidavits, or whether he believes that even if true they are an exception to a practice which in general and on most occasions is designed
to, and in fact does, protect the privacy and dignity of the welfare
recipient, at least as much as possible.
Moreover, Justice Blackmun continues, in this particular case
Mrs. James has no specific complaint about any particular unreasonable intrusion of her home.9 1 He notes that, on this record, "nothing
. . .supports an inference that the desired home visit had as its purpose the obtaining of information as to criminal activity.1 9 2 This is
one of the ways in which the James majority distinguishes prior administrative search cases, particularly Camara v. Municipal Court93 and
88. Id. at 320-21.
89. Id. at 321.
90. Id. at 320-21 n.8.
91. See id. at 321. In Smith v. Board of Commissioners, 259 P. Supp. 423
(D.D.C. 1966), AFDC mothers complained about welfare caseworkers using harsh, oppressive, humiliating and illegal methods in conducting eligibility investigations. The
court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment because, inter alia, the equitable relief sought by the plaintiffs was inappropriate since: the caseworkers engaged
in the alleged illegal investigations were unnamed; the court could not instruct such
officials how to perform their duties; and even if the court could so instruct them,
and hold them in contempt if the instructions were not followed, the court has no
means to supervise and determine whether there is daily compliance with the type of
injunction sought.
92. 400 U.S. 321 (1971).
93. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 25

See v. City of Seattle,9 4 which held the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement applicable. 95 Justice Blackmun went on to say:
She complains of no proposed visitation at an awkward or retirement hour. She suggests no forcible entry. She refers to no
snooping. She describes no impolite or reprehensible conduct of
any kind. She alleges only, in general and nonspecific terms, that
on previous visits and, on information and belief, on visitation at
the home of other aid recipients, "questions concerning personal
relationships, beliefs and behavior are raised and pressed which
are unnecessary for a determination of continuing eligibility."
Paradoxically, this same complaint could be made of a conference
held elsewhere 96than in the home, and yet this is what is sought
by Mrs. James.
Justice Blackmun concludes his observations about the ingratitude
and lack of any legitimate basis for Mrs. James' complaints about the
home visit with what he perceives to be the real reason for her objection to the home visit: what Mrs. James is really after is to have
AFDC benefits provided on her own conditions rather than upon those
conditions deemed necessary or desirable by the provider of the benefitS.17 We are here at the heart-or the guts--of the James majority's
view of both the individual welfare claimant, especially the AFDC
mother, and, derivatively, the doctrinal status of welfare benefits. One
of the conditions upon which Mrs. James wanted to be able to exercise
her own choice with respect to receiving AFDC is a condition which,
as the three dissenting justices argue, involves her Fourth Amendment
rights. 98 Justice Blackmun, author of the James majority opinion, in
effect answers her: "If you want to receive the government's
'charity,' 99 then you take it on the conditions under which we choose
to give it to you." Or as Justice Blackmun elsewhere puts it:
The only consequence of her [Mrs. James'] refusal [to allow the
caseworker into her home pursuant to the "home visit" regulations] is that the payment of benefits ceases. Important and serious as this is, the situation is no different than if she had exercised a similar negative choice initially and refrained from apply94. Id. at 541.
95. Compare 400 U.S. at 317, 324-25, with id. at 330-31 (Douglas, J., dissenting), and id. at 339-41 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 321.
97. "What Mrs. James appears to want from the agency that provides her and
her infant son with the necessitites for life is the right to receive those necessities upon
her own informational terms, to utilize the Fourth Amendment as a wedge for imposing
those terms .... ." Id. at 321-22.
98. See id. at 330-33 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 338-42 (Marshall, J., joined
by Brennan, J., dissenting).
99. For Justice Blackmun's characterization of welfare assistance as charity see
id. at 319. See text accompanying note 80 supra.
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ing for AFDC benefits. 00
Or, as Justice Marshall, in his dissent, argues:
Although the Court does not agree with my conclusion that
the home visit is an unreasonable search, its opinion suggests that
even if the visit were unreasonable appellee has somehow waived
her right to object. Surely the majority cannot believe that valid
Fourth Amendment consent can be given under the threat of the
loss of one's sole means of support. Nor has Mrs. James waived
her rights. Had the Court squarely faced the question of whether
the State can condition welfare payments on the waiver of clear
constitutional rights, the answer would be plain. The decisions
of this Court do not support the notion that a State can use welfare benefits as a wedge to coerce "waiver" of Fourth Amendment
rights ....

As my Brother Douglas points out, the majority

statement that Mrs. James' "choice [to be seached or to lose her
benefits] is entirely hers, and nothing of constitutional magnitude
is involved" merely restates the issue. 10 1
Justice Douglas phrases the issue in his dissent:
The question in this case is whether receipt of largesse from the
government makes the home of the beneficiary subject to access
by an inspector of the agency of oversight, even though the beneficiary objects to the intrusion and even though the Fourth
Amendment's procedure for access for one's house or home is not
followed. The penalty here is not, of course, invasion of the privacy of Barbara James, only her loss of federal or state largesse.
That, however, is merely rephrasing the problem. Whatever the
semantics, the central question is whether the government by force
of its largesse has
0 2 the power to "buy up" rights guaranteed by
the Constitution.
The James majority's answer to this last question is, of course,
that the government can indeed "buy up' the Fourth Amendment
rights of welfare recipients such as Mrs. James. This answer is based
on both the doctrinal reasons discussed above-doctrinal reasons which
constitute a serious erosion, if not an implicit overruling, of Goldberg
-and the underlying political-legal policy reasons discussed below.
The Political Debate
The doctrinal erosion of Goldberg v. Kelly evidenced by the Burger Court majority's approach in the four major welfare due process
cases of 1971-1973-Perales,Wright, Ortwein and James-canbest be
explained and understood by comparing the attitude of the Goldberg majority with the attitude of the majorities in these cases toward:
(1) The welfare recipient as an individual, in terms of the kind
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 325 (emphasis added).
Id. at 344-45.
Id. at 327-28.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 25

of person he or she is, and the kind of reason(s) for the typical welfare claimant's dependence on government financial assistance;
(2) The group or societal interest in the welfare system, in terms
of the purposes which are or should be served by that system; and,
(3) The nature of the welfare bureaucracy and those officials
who administer it, especially in terms of the extent to which the bureaucracy and its officials are beneficent dispensers of government
largesse or are perpetrators of a regulatory maze with inherent potential for abuse of power.
The way in which the Goldberg majority views the above three
factors will be compared, in this part of the article, with the way in
which these three factors are viewed by the new Burger Court majority, as evidenced by the majority opinions in Perales, Wright, Ortwein and James. The following comparison of attitudes toward these
factors explains why the Burger Court majority has undermined both
the doctrinal stance and the political philosophy of Goldberg that it
is in society's interest, as well as in the interest of the individual welfare claimant, to provide a "rule of law"'01 for those persons dependent upon welfare assistance.
The Goldberg majority views the welfare recipient facing threatened termination of assistance as someone who is in a worse position,
financially, legally, and politically, than are recipients of any other
form of government largesse facing suspension, termination, or reduction of that largesse, such as government contractors, government employees, taxpayers claiming an exemption, "or virtually anyone else
whose governmental entitlements are ended .... "104 Unlike claimants of other forms of government largesse, a welfare recipient facing
termination without notice and a pre-termination hearing may be deprived "of the very means by which to live while he waits."' 1 5 More
over, unlike the above examples of persons receiving or seeking other
forms of government largesse, the welfare recipient facing termination
[1]acks independent resources, [and] his situation becomes
immediately desperate. His need to concentrate upon finding the
means for daily subsistence, in turn, adversely affects his ability
to seek redress from the welfare bureaucracy.' 06
In addition to recognizing the sui generis position of a welfare
103. See generally F. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944); Jones, The Rule
of Law and the Welfare State, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 143 (1958). See also Wright, Poverty, Minorities,and Respect for Law, 1970 DuKE L.J. 425.
104. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970).
105. Id.
106. Id.
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recipient facing termination of benefits, especially in terms of the increased desperateness of the situation facing that recipient caused by
the lack of a pre-termination hearing, the majority in Goldberg explicitiy recognizes that placing a welfare recipient in such a position further destroys the little, if any, power such a person may have to attempt to redress his or her situation legally. This awareness of the
sui generis nature of the situation facing a welfare recipient threatened
with loss of assistance without a pre-termination hearing flows from
a very important threshold understanding of, or attitude towards, poverty in general. It is summed up in Justice Brennan's statement: "We
have come to recognize that forces not within the control of the poor
1 7
contribute to their poverty. 1
This attitude of the Goldberg majority toward the individual welfare recipient indicates an awareness of the precarious nature of the
financial, legal and political situation of the welfare recipient. This
awareness is evidenced by the Goldberg majority's explicit recognition
that poverty is not something which someone chooses.
The Goldberg majority's attitude toward the first factor-the type
of person who is typically a welfare recipient--coincides with its attitude towards the second factor-the group or societal interest in the
welfare system. When Justice Brennan discusses the application of
the balancing standard of review adopted in Goldberg,L08 he places
on the welfare recipient's side of the scales a public interest in promoiing a "rule of law" for the individual dependent on welfare. As
pointed out above, Justice Brennan argues that:
Welfare, by meeting the basic demands of subsistence, can help
bring within the reach of the poor the same opportunities that are
available to others to participate meaningfully in the life of the
community. At the same time, welfare guards against the societal
malaise that may flow from a widespread sense of unjustified frustration and insecurity. Public assistance, then, is not mere charity,
but a means to "promote the general Welfare, and secure the
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity." The same
governmental interest that counsel the provision of welfare, counsel as well its uninterrupted provision to those eligible to receive
it.

. . .109

107. Id. at 265. See P. Jacobs, America's Schizophrenic View of the Poor, in
PovERTY: Vmws FROm Tin LEFT 39-57 (J. Lamer & I. Howe eds. 1968). See also
G. MYRDAL, CRLLENGE TO AFFLuENCE, chs. 2-4 (1962).
108. 397 U.S. at 262-63.
109. Id. at 265. See also REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON
CwVIL DisoRDERs 283-88 (New York Times ed. 1968); P. JACOBS, PRELUDE TO RiOT
7-12 (1966); Wright, Poverty, Minorities, and Respect for Law, 1970 DUKE LJ. 42530, 439-40. For an analogous argument in the criminal law area, see Justice Frankfur-
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Thus, the Goldberg majority views the presence of welfare as
serving not only the interest of those individuals who may be recipients, now or in the future, but also as serving a societal interest. It
views that societal interest as completely compatible with that of the

individual recipient.

That is, the Goldberg majority recognizes that

it is in the self-interest of everyone, no matter how financially secure,
to provide welfare assistance in a manner which allows the recipient
to feel that he or she is part of society's "rule of law.""'
The Goldberg majority does not distinguish the group or class
interest in welfare from the interest of the individual recipient and
of society generally. The group interest of all those who are on welfare now or potentially seems to be viewed implicitly as being one
which coincides with that of the individual recipient facing termination,
as well as that of society generally: Everyone currently or potentially
on welfare has a stake in having a welfare system which is administered fairly, which necessarily includes administrative methods
grounded in a recognition of the particular plight and abilities of the
individuals involved."'
ter's reliance on the idea that democracy requires safeguards against abuse of law enforcement authority in McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343-44 (1943).
110. See Briar, Welfare From Below: Recipients' Views of the Public Welfare
System, 54 CALEF. L. REV. 370, 376-77 (1966), which discusses the importance of recognizing that recipients are entitled to their benefits as a matter of statutory right, see
note 28 supra, especially so that welfare officials will "inculcate in recipients a conception of themselves as rights-bearing citizens."
111. "The opportunity to be heard must be tailored to the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard." 397 U.S. at 268-69. See text accompanying
note 37 supra. However, Guerrero v. Carleson, 9 Cal. 3d 808, 512 P.2d 833, 109 Cal.
Rptr. 201 (1973), held that welfare authorities need not, as a matter of procedural
due process, send notices of proposed terminations, required by Goldberg's due process
holding in Spanish, even for those recipients, the plaintiffs, who are in fact, known
by the welfare authorities to be unable to read English. The plaintiffs had alleged,
and the court did not dispute, that sending such notices in English to the plaintiffs
often resulted, and would continue to often result, in welfare recipients illiterate in English losing their opportunity to request a fair hearing to challenge the legality of the
proposed termination, the pre-termination hearing held constitutionally required in
Goldberg. See also Carmona v. Sheffield, 325 F. Supp. 1341 (N.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd,
475 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1973), relied upon by the majority in Guerrero. Carmona
dismissed an action oy Spanish speaking citizens alleging a denial of Equal Protectin
because the State unemployment insurance program is administered entirely in English.
But, Castro v. California, 2 Cal. 3d 223, 466 P.2d 244, 85 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1970), held
that English literacy requirements applied to exclude citizens literate in Spanish with
access to Spanish mass media from voting violated equal protection.
Castro was
relied upon by Justice Tobriner, dissenting in Guerrero. Justice Tobriner concludes
his dissent with an express concern over the retreat of the majority from the principles
of Goldberg and Castro: "In the long effort of the subgroups in our culture to attain
recognition and participation the majority opinion can only be an unfortunate step
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The only way in which the group or class interest involved in
Goldberg can be construed as contrary to or somewhat inconsistent
with the interest of either the individual welfare recipient facing termination or of society generally, is if Goldberg is expanded to the point
112
suggested by Justice Black's "parade of horribles" in his dissent;
and, such an expansion of procedural safeguards for welfare recipients
facing termination, including those already mandated by Goldberg, are
financed by the states out of resources which would otherwise be allocated to payment of welfare benefits to eligible claimants.
There is absolutely no authority, in the case law or elsewhere,
to support an administrative resource allocation system whereby the
costs of providing procedural safeguards for welfare recipients can be
offset by reductions in the level of benefits paid to eligible welfare
recipients. Not even Rosado v. Wyman,1 3 nor Danderidge v. Williams," 4 the two United States Supreme Court decisions which dealt
a severe blow to the legal progress of welfare recipients with respect
particularly to the amount of assistance to which eligible claimaints
are entitled, justify, let alone counsel, such an aberrational notion.
Rosado held that states need not increase the actual level of welfare
benefits paid to recipients, but need only revise upward their "standards of need" which are used to determine financial eligibility, in order
to comply with a 1967 congressional amendment requiring adjustments
for cost-of-living increases. Dandridge upheld against challenges under both the federal AFDC statutes and the Fourteenth Amendment's
equal protection clause, Maryland's maximum-per-family-grant rule
under which children in large AFDC families receive lower welfare
backwards." Guerrero v. Carleson, 9 Cal. 3d 808, 843, 512 P.2d 833, 843, 109 Cal.
Rptr. 201, 211 (1973) (Tobriner, J., dissenting). This represents a retreat similar to
that evidenced by the four post-Goldberg United States Supreme Court decisions discussed here.
See generally Comment, "Citado A Comparecer": Language Barriers and Due
Process-Is Mailed Notice in English Constitutionally Sufficient?, 61 CALIF. L. REV.
1395 (1973); Note, El Derecho de Adviso: Due Process and Bilingual Notice, 83 YALE

L.J 385 (1973).
112. 397 U.S. at 278-79 (Black, J., dissenting). See text accompanying note 48
supra. See Justice Tobriner's dissent in Guerrero v. Carleson, 9 Cal. 3d 808, 512 P.2d
833, 109 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1973), on the use of a "parade of horribles" argument by
the majority in Guerrero similar to that of Justice Black's dissent in Goldberg: "'he
parade of horribles here, as so often, is no more than a retreat into the irrational.
Surely we do not suggest that defendants would necessarily be required to furnish notices [required under Goldberg] in Basque or Chippewa." 9 Cal. 3d at 822, 512 P.2d
at 842, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 210.
113. 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
114. 397 U.S. 471 (1970). See note 52 supra.
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payments per capita than children in a smaller AFDC family solely
by reason of the size of the family with whom the AFDC child resides.
While Rosado and Dandridge make it very clear that the United
States Supreme Court will not construe either the federal AFDC statutes or the Fourteenth Amendment in such a way as to require the
states to allocate more money en toto either to maintain certain levels
of welare benefits, or to equalize benefit payments among various
AFDC families, these two decisions cannot possibly be considered, individually or in combination, as precedent for allowing a state to divert
whatever resources would otherwise be used to provide benefit payments to eligible welfare claimants in order to pay for the administrative costs of the procedure mandated in Goldberg or, for that matter,
the costs of any further procedural safeguards which could have been,
or conceivably still could be, required as an extension of Goldberg.
To decide otherwise, the United States Supreme Court would be requiring individual eligible welfare claimants to pay, as a practical matter, by reduction from their own benefit allocations, for the procedural
safeguards to which all welfare recipients are entitled as a matter of
due process.
To uphold the legality of such a payment requirement, via welfare benefit grant reductions, for enjoyment of the procedural safeguards to which welfare recipients are constitutionally entitled under
Goldberg, would be to allow the states to condition welfare eligibility
on the giving up of the claimant's constitutional right to due process
of law. Such a result, if sanctioned by the United States Supreme
Court, would directly involve that Court in imposing an unconstitutional condition" 15 on the receipt of welfare assistance. That would
clearly contravene what the Court said in Goldberg."6 It would also
contravene a long line of Supreme Court decisions, perhaps epitomized
by Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 17 the 1966 poll tax case,
and still recognized by the Burger Court-in cases such as Bullock
v. Carter,"' involving campaign filing fees-holding that an individual
may not be required to pay for government privileges by waiving constitutional rights to which the individual recipient would otherwise be entitled, and to which all other citizens remain entitled. While I agree
with the dissenters in Wyman v. James"9 that the majority's decision
115.
116.
117.
118.

See
397
383
405

119.

400 U.S. 309, 327-30, 344-45 (1971).

supra.

note
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

22 supra. See also text accompanying note 28 supra.
at 262. See also text accompanying note 81 supra.
663 (1966).
134 (1972).

See text accompanying notes 101-02
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constitutes a retreat to the early "right-privilege"'120 distinction underlying the approach of Flemming v. Nestor,12 1 I also emphasize that the
James decision in no way suggests that welfare recipients must pay,
via grant reductions or otherwise, for the administrative costs of implementing constitutional rights to which they are entitled under decisions
of the United States Supreme Court.
The last of the three factors, towards which the attitude of the
Goldberg majority differs sharply from that of the majorities in Perales,
Wright, Ortwein, and James, is the nature of the welfare bureaucracy
and of the welfare officials with whom welfare claimants have individual contact, such as the caseworker conducting the home visit in James.
The difference in attitudes between the Goldberg majority and the
majorities in Perales, Wright, Ortwein, and James towards this third
factor coincides with, or complements, the difference in attitudes
toward the first two factors. This attitudinal difference also provides
a crucial basis upon which to understand the doctrinal disparities between Goldberg, on the one hand, and these four major post-Goldberg
decisions, on the other hand.
The attitude of the Goldberg majority towards the welfare bureaucracy as an institution, and towards the individuals who administer
the welfare system, especially those who come into personal contact
on a somewhat daily basis with recipients, is one of healthy skepticism.
This healthy skepticism is evidenced both by the majority's refusal
to defer consideration of the procedural due process claim until after
the pending HEW regulation was implemented, and also by the type
of procedural safeguards which the Court found necessary as minimum
compliance with the due process clause.
The pending HEW regulation, as Justice Burger points out in his
dissent, 122 provided more protection for the recipient facing termination than was required under the Goldberg due process holding. The
extra protection provided by the pending HEW regulation was assistance of counsel. Although Justice Brennan clearly recognizes the
importance of counsel, particularly in cases in which the individual fac12 3
ing a government bureaucracy is poor and typically uneducated,
120. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
121. 363 U.S. 603 (1960). See note 25 supra; accord, Wyman v. James, 400 U.S.
309, 329-30 n.8 (1971) (Douglas, I., dissenting).
122. 397 U.S. at 282-83 (Burger, CJ., dissenting). See also text accompanying
note 68 supra.
123. "'The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did
not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.' We do not say that counsel must
be provided at the pre-termination hearing, but only that the recipient must be allowed
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Goldberg holds that the due process clause, applied in the context of

welfare pretermination hearings, requires only that the claimant is entitled to legal representation.'
That is, the government has no obligation to provide counsel for those who cannot afford to retain an
attorney, which obviously would include the vast bulk, if not all, of
welfare claimants facing termination of benefits.
The Goldberg majority decided the constitutional issue raised by
the welfare claimants even though its due process holding required
fewer procedural safeguards than would have been provided by the
pending HEW regulation. This decision to adjudicate the constitutional issue was necessary because prior HEW regulations expanding
procedural safeguards for claimants in fair hearings 12' had been
adopted but then not implemented after several revised dates of effectiveness. Therefore, although the Goldberg majority nowhere suggests it considers any such factual or political assumption, it must have
believed that HEW would promulgate and implement regulations providing sufficient procedural safeguards only if HEW knew the extent
of the procedural safeguards which the Supreme Court would consider
constitutionally required. Such a procedural posture on the part of
the Supreme Court reflects a skepticism with respect to the willingness
of HEW to implement regulations providing sufficient procedural safeguards. However, it also reflects a confidence that HEW would go
forward with its pending regulation, and not turn around and provide
only those safeguards specifically held to be constitutionally required.
This skepticism-plus a sufficient degree of confidence-towards
HEW is also reflected in the particular procedural safeguards required
by Goldberg. This is especially true of the requirement that "the decisionmaker's conclusion as to a recipient's eligibility must rest solely
on the legal rules and evidence adduced at the hearing,"' 2 6 and the
requirement that "the decision maker . . . state the reasons for his
"127
determination and indicate the evidence he relied on ....

These requirements obviously reflect an attempt to ensure both fairness and compliance with the law in welfare pre-termination hearings
by, inter alia, guaranteeing an adequate record for the claimant's use
to retain an attorney if he so desires." Id. at 270 (citations omitted); cf. State v. Jamison, 251 Ore. 114, 444 P.2d 15 (1968). See generally Carlin & Howard, Legal Representation and Class Justice, 12 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 381 (1965); Note, The Indigent's
Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 YALE L.J. 545 (1967).
124. 397 U.S. at 270.
125. See note 16 supra.

126.

397 U.S. at 271.

127.

Id.
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if he or she wishes to seek judicial review of an adverse administrative
decision. Moreover, these two requirements are bolstered by the final
one, namely, an impartial decisionmaker1 28 However, the Court also
takes pains to devise a pretermination hearing which explicitly falls
short of a judicial adversary proceeding, in terms of both the safeguards to which the claimant is entitled, such as use of legal rules
of evidence and assistance of an appointed attorney for those unable
to afford their own representation, and the nature of the decision-making proccess and the person or official who makes that decision. Thus,
although there is no requirement of a full opinion or formal findings
of fact, but merely a requirement of a statement of reasons along with
the requirement that the decision-maker's conclusion rest only on those
reasons, the majority in Goldberg recognizes the essential requirement
of an impartial decisionmaker. In order to satisfy this latter requirement the Court accepts the fact that prior involvement in some aspects
of a case need not necessarily bar a welfare official from acting as
a decision-maker. However, the official cannot be the same person
who was involved in making the initial determination under review
at the pretermination hearing. '
The Goldberg majority's refusal to defer constitutional adjudication pending inplementation of a new HEW regulation, along with the
minimum procedural safeguards found necessary under the due process clause, indicate an awareness on the part of the Goldberg majority
of the potential abuses of power, incompetence, and unfairness which
are inherent in any large bureaucracy. These dangers inhere especially in a bureaucracy which dispenses welfare benefits, since those
directly affected are totally dependent upon those benefits, and lack
the resources to individually or collectively ensure that they receive
the benefits and are accorded the procedural safeguards to which they
are entitled. This awareness of the dangers inherent in bureaucracies,
particularly those dealing with the underprivileged in our society, coincides with a general skepticism about any governmental agency which
wields power over the daily lives of individuals reflected in many of
the Warren Court decisions, such as Mirandav. Arizona3 0 and Greene
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). However, in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222
(1971), the Court held, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Burger, that statements
inadmissible in the prosecution's case in chief because obtained in violation of Miranda,
could be used to attack the credibility of the defendant if he takes the stand. As
pointed out by Justice Brennan in his dissent, 384 U.S. at 226-32, the majority's position undermined the principles developed to protect the Fifth Amendment's guarantee

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

V. McElroy.'

[Vol. 25

31

The Goldberg majority's view of the welfare claimant, and its attitude toward society's interest in the welfare system, and the skepticism it displays toward the welfare bureaucracy as an institution, are
all in sharp contrast with the attitude toward these three factors displayed in the majority opinions in Perales, Wright, Ortwein, and
James. The difference in attitude towards the individual welfare
recipient between the Goldberg majority and the majorities in the four
post-Goldberg decisions is displayed most markedly in James. The
various reasons given by Justice Blackmun for considering the "home
visit" to be reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment,
assuming it is considered a search within the meaning of that amendment, reflect distrust of the credibility and competency of the adult
AFDC recipient, especially the AFDC mother, as well as a belief that
such a recipient is trying to "get something for nothing."

Justice Blackmun, in discussing the public's interest in maintaining rules such as that requiring home visits, compares the legal and
moral status of the AFDC child-recipient with that of the adult relative
-usually the child's mother-who collects the AFDC assistance for
both the child's and his or her own needs. 1 32 Justice Blackmun coragainst self-incrimination, especially Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), prohibiting prosecutors from commenting on a defendant's failure to take the stand, as
well as the prophylactic protection of the Miranda warning requirements. Cf. McGee,
Blacks, Due Process and Efficiency in the Clash of Values as the Supreme Court
Moves to the Right, 2 BLACK L.J. 220 (1972).
131. 360 U.S. 474 (1959). In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972),
and Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), the Court held that a state university
or college teacher must have tenure, or an expectation in continued employment
amounting to "de facto tenure," in order to have a sufficient property interest under
the due process clause to be entitled to a statement of reasons and a hearing if the
teacher is not to be rehired. Compare the majority opinion of Justice Stewart, who
also authored the majority opinion in Roth and Perry, in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67, 88-90 and n. 21 (1972), rejecting the Sniadach-Goldberg balancing approach as
irrelevant for determining whether a pre-taking hearing is constitutionally required as
opposed to the constitutionally required form of such a hearing.
Justice Douglas in his dissent in Wyman v. James discussing the dangers inherent in the ever growing bureaucracy of modem government stated: "The bureaucracy
of modern government is not only slow, lumbering, and oppressive; it is omnipresent.
It touches everyone's life at numerous points. It pries more and more into private
affairs, breaking down the barriers that individuals erect to give them some insulation
from the intrigues and harrassments of modem life." 400 U.S. at 335. See text accompanying note 166 infra.
132. Eligibility for AFDC is based on both financial need, which is determined
primarily by state law, Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 478 (1970), and on the
presence of a minor in a family who is a "dependent child," as defined by federal
law. See note 133 infra. Assuming that a woman and her child(ren) meet both the
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recfly points out that the primary beneficiary of the AFDC program
is the dependent child-a child in a family which lacks a "bread winner" because the father is either dead, absent from the home, or incapacitated.1 3 3 The person who actually receives the AFDC benefits,
federal eligibility criteria and the state's financial need standard so as to qualify for
AFDC assistance, the actual payments, the amount of which are also determined by
state law, are made to the "responsible relative" with whom the child(ren) is (are)
living, in this case the mother, and the benefit level to which that AFDC family unit
is entitled, that is, the dollar amount of the AFDC family payment considered en toto,
is based on the needs of the adult recipient as well as on the needs of the child(ren).
See 42 U.S.C. § 606(b) (1970); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 479 (1970).
These needs as well as the benefit level are determined, as is the financial-need (eligibility) standard, primarily by state law. See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 408-09
(1970).
133. "Dependent child" is defined as: "a needy child (1) who has been deprived
of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from the home,
or physical or mental incapacity of a parent, and who is living with his father, mother,
grandfather, grandmother, brother, sister, stepfather, stepmother, stepbrother, stepsister,
uncle, aunt, first cousin, nephew, or niece, in a place of residence maintained by one
or more of such relatives as his or their own home, and (2) who is (A) under the
age of eighteen, or (B) under the age of twenty-one and . . . a student regularly attending a school, college, or university, or regularly attending a course of vocational
or technical training designed to fit him for gainful employment." 42 U.S.C. § 606(a)
(1970).
The leading Supreme Court case construing the term "dependent child," as well
as the AFDC program, including its legislative history and purpose, is King v. Smith,
392 U.S. 309 (1968). See also Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971); Lewis v.
Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970).
It should be noted that both the statutory definition of "dependent child" and the
Supreme Court's interpretation in King v. Smith require the absence of a "breadwinner" in the traditional sense. That is, AFDC eligibility requires that the "family" with
whom the needy child resides lacks a man to support the child, either because the
child's father is physically and/or legally apart from the family, or because he is incapacitated, i.e., unemployable, so that his presence in the family adds to, rather than
reduces, the financial need of the child.
If a child who is needy and who would otherwise be eligible for AFDC, except
for the fact that the need is due to the father's unemployment, rather than his absence
from the home or incapacity while he is present, then neither the family nor the needy
child is eligible for public assistance under any federal program unless the state in
which the family resides has opted, as only about half of the states have, to have an
AFDC-UF program, 42 U.S.C. § 607 (1970). See Carroll v. Finch, 326 F. Supp. 891
(D. Alaska 1971) (upholding the optional-state discretion nature of the AFDC-UF
program); Burr v. Smith, 322 F. Supp. 980 (W.D. Wash. 1971) (upholding the exclusion from AFDC-UF of families otherwise eligible where the father is eligible for state
unemployment compensation, even though the latter provides lower benefits than the
family as a unit would otherwise receive in AFDC-UF assistance). Macias v. Finch,
324 F. Supp. 1252 (N.D. Cal.), affd sub nom. Macias v. Richardson, 400 U.S. 913
(1970) held that the meaning of "unemployment" under the AFDC-UF program, includes some part time work, but excludes any non-part time work, as defined by HEW
regulations, even if the work results in less money for the wage earner's family than
the family would receive in AFDC-UF benefits if the father were partially or totally
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on the other hand-the adult who fits within the class of enumerated
relatives and in whose home the AFDC child resides-is at best only
a derivatively intended beneficiary.'
However, this primary-derivative eligibility distinction created by the federal AFDC statutory
scheme in no way justifies the James' view of the adult AFDC recipient, particularly the AFDC mother in her role as caretaker of the
primary AFDC beneficiary. The AFDC child is seen as a potential
victim, not of official lawlessness or carelessness, and not even of
incompetency or lack of time on the part of the individual caseworkers,
but, rather, as the potential victim of the AFDC mother. Thus Justice
Blackmun pits the needs and care of the AFDC child against the constitutional rights of the AFDC mother, as if these two were necessarily
incompatible with each other. So he makes statements like: "The
dependent child's needs are paramount, and only with hesitancy would
we relegate those needs, in the scale of comparative values, to a position secondary to what the mother claims as her rights."' 35
The above view of the AFDC mother and the pitting of her rights
against the best interests of her child coincides with Justice Blackmun's
view of the AFDC mother as someone who would try to abuse the
system for her own personal gain by using the Fourth Amendment
as a "wedge" to get welfare on her own terms.' 30 This attitude
towards the AFDC mother obviously reflects a deep distrust of her
integrity as an individual as well as her competency as a parent. Even
more unfortunately, it reveals a type of disrepect which I doubt is ever
implied, let alone explicitly revealed, with respect to persons who receive government largesse, not because they are poor, but because
unemployed, as is the case with very large poor families, especially when the father
is engaged in e.g., agricultural work. See also Note on the Decision in Macias v. Finch
and the Exclusion of the Unemployed From Categorical Assistance, in BRUDNO, supra

note 1, at 842-44.
134. Cf. Brudno (then Rintala), Foreward: "Status" Concepts in the Law of
Torts, 58

CALIF.

L. REV. 80, 94, 111 (1970), on the difference between direct and

derivative, or "privity"-based, rights of tort victims. For a particularly clear example
of the latter, as well as for a very clear tort analog to the AFDC mother's eligibility
for assistance, see Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 733, 441 P.2d 912, 916, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 72, 76 (1968). Dillon makes the mother's right to recover for injuries sustained
through schok at witnessing, but not personally being in the "zone of danger" of, a
car accident injuring her child a derivative of the child's right to recover, that is, dependent upon the defendant being legally liable for the injury, or death, of the childthe "primary" accident victim-analogous to the "dependent-child"-primary-beneficiary of the AFDC program.
135. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 318 (1971).
136. Id. at 321-22; see text accompanying note 138 infra. See generally Kulzer,
Invisible Woman? Role-Perception in Welfare Litigation,2 BLACK L.J. 257 (1972).
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they provide some type of service for which the government pays them
welfare by another name. As Justice Douglas states in his dissent
in James:
If the welfare recipient was not Barbara James but a prominent, affluent cotton or wheat farmer receiving benefit payments
for not growing crops, would not the approach be different? Welfare in aid of dependent children, like social security and unemployment benefits, has an aura of suspicion. There doubtless are
frauds in every sector of public welfare whether the recipient be
a Barbara James or someone who is prominent or influential. But
constitutional rights. . . are obviously not dependent on the poverty or on the affluence of the beneficiary .... 137
Finally, the James majority, for no apparent reason, invades the
personal privacy of Mrs. James and thereby further displays their lack
of respect for AFDC mothers. In discussing why the AFDC child's
needs have to be protected at the expense of the AFDC mother's constitutional rights, Justice Blackmun openly casts doubt on Mrs. James'
competency and reliability as a parent. In the footnote to his statement that Mrs. James wants to use the Fourth Amendment "as a
wedge. . to avoid questions of any kind,"'13 8 Justice Blackmun says:
We have examined Mrs. James' case record with the New
York City Department of Social Services, which, as an exhibit,
accompanied dependent Wyman's answer. . . . The record is revealing as to Mrs. James' failure ever really to satisfy the requirement for eligibility; as to constant and repeated demands; as to
attitude toward the caseworker; as to reluctance to cooperate; as
to evasiveness; and as to occasional belligerency. There are indications that all was not always well with the infant Maurice (skull
fracture, a dent in the head, a possible rat bite). The picture
is a sad and unhappy one.' 3 9
This exposure of personal "facts" about Mrs. James and her son
and of evaluations of them by a welfare caseworker, contained in a
theoretically private file, is wholly gratuitious because they have
nothing to do with the constitutional issue in James. The gratuitousness of the exposure is another indication of the post-Goldberg majority's negative attitude towards welfare claimants, especially welfare
mothers. AFDC mothers are somehow more suspect as a class than
are any other category of parents. As Justice Marshall points out in
his dissent:
First, it is argued that the home visit is justified to protect
dependent children from "abuse" and "exploitation." These are
heinous crimes, but they are not confined to indigent households.
137. 400 U.S. at 332 (citations omitted) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 322.
139. Id. at 322 n.9.
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Would the majority sanction, in the absence of probable cause,
compulsory visits to all American homes for the purpose of discovering child abuse? Or is this Court prepared to hold as a matter of constitutional law that a mother, merely because she is poor,
140
is substantially more likely to injure or exploit her children.
This distrust and disrespect for those dependent on AFDC assistance, more than fifty percent of whom are non-white, and more than
ninety percent of whom (the adult AFDC recipients) are women, is further revealed in another argument put forth by Justice Blackmun to
justify treating the home visit as if it is not a search within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment. Justice Blackmun argues:
The emphasis of the New York statutes and regulations is
upon the home, upon "close contact" with the beneficiary, upon
restoring the aid recipient "to a condition of self-support," and
upon the relief of his distress. The federal emphasis is no different. It is upon "assistance and rehabilitation," upon maintaining and strengthening family life, and upon "maximum self-support and personal independence consistent with the maintenance
of continuing parental care and protection .... 141
Contrary to the implicit assumption in this argument, the fact that
rehabilitation and self-support are two of the statutorily stated purposes
of the AFDC program" is in no way inconsistent, logically, doctrinally, or politically, with allowing an AFDC recipient to enjoy his or
her Fourth Amendment rights. Justice Blackmun and the other five
justices concurring in James, however, seem to think that an AFDC
recipient somehow needs to be rehabilitated in such a way that the
recipient's attempt to exercise his or her constitutional rights conflicts
with or hampers this rehabilitation purpose. As Justice Marshall
points out in his dissent, the majority opinion in James reflects a paternalism toward AFDC recipients, particularly AFDC mothers, which
the vast number of citizens not dependent upon welfare would never
accept as applicable to themselves and, in most likelihood would never
14
be required, let alone asked, to accept.
This distrust and disrespect which the post-Goldberg majority
bears toward the individual AFDC recipient, which is so blatantly revealed in Justice Blackmun's opinion in James, is also evident, but
less vividly, in Perales, Wright, and Ortwein. In all three of these
140.

Id. at 341-42 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

141.
142.

Id. at 319.
42 U.S.C. § 601 (1970).

143. "Appellants offer [another] state interest [which] the court seems to accept
as partial justification for this search. We are told that the visit is designed to rehabilitate, to provide aid. This is strange doctrine indeed. A paternalistic notion that a
complaining citizen's constitutional rights can be violated so long as the State is somehow helping him is alien to our Nation's philosophy." 400 U.S. at 343 (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
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cases, the Court, when faced with a choice between imposing new
procedural rules on the welfare bureaucracy or letting the welfare
claimant just proceed as best as possible within the current regulatory
maze, always opts for the latter. This is due, not only to the Burger
Court majority's attitude toward society's interest in the welfare system
and toward the welfare bureaucracy, as will be discussed further below, 1 44 but also to an attitude toward the individual welfare claimant
which can be described as at best one of lack of concern and empathy.
In Richardson v. Wright,145 the Court essentially says to the petitioners, "Go back and complain using the existing administrative procedures; we will worry about your constitutional rights later, if you
lose after exhausting your present administrative remedies." Compounding the difficulties imposed upon the welfare claimants by the
decision in Wright, the Court in Ortwein v. Schwab 4 ' says to the welfare claimants who lose at the administrative hearing, "We cannot help
it if you cannot afford the $25 filing fee to seek judicial review of
an adverse administrative determination; one hearing is enough for
you, even if others who depend upon government largesse can obtain
appellate review of adverse administrative rulings simply because they
47
are not dependent on welfare." Finally, in Richardson v. Perales,
the Court upholds an administrative finding of no disability insurance
eligibility, even though that finding rested solely on the hearsay report
of one doctor which conflicted with all the live testimony of the hearing, including that of examining doctors. Given the combination of
these three cases and the procedural posture adopted by the Court
therein, there appears to be little concern for protecting the individual
welfare claimant.
The attitudes toward the individual welfare claimant displayed in
the four major post-Goldberg decisions contrast sharply with that of
the Goldberg majority. The latter views the welfare claimant as a
rights-bearing citizen who, in most cases, is poor for reasons completely beyond his or her control, and whose interest in receiving both
adequate and fairly administered welfare payments coincides with society's interest in alleviating poverty and providing a "rule of law,"
and thereby a "stake in the system," for all individuals dealing with
any government bureaucracy. 48 This disparity in attitudes toward the
144. See text beginning at note 148 infra.
145. 405 U.S. 208 (1972). See text accompanying notes 63-74 supra.
146. 410 U.S. 656 (1973). See text accompanying notes 49-57 supra.
147. 402 U.S. 389 (1971). See text accompanying notes 39-47 supra.
148. 397 U.S. at 265. See text accompanying notes 108-10 supra; see notes 103,
107, 109-10 supra.
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individual welfare claimant between the Goldberg majority and the
majorities in Perales, Wright, Ortwein and James coincides with a similar disparity of attitudes toward the group interest or society's stake
in the welfare system, and also toward the nature of the welfare bureaucracy and those officials who administer it.
The difference in attitudes between the Burger Court majority
and the Goldberg majority toward these second and third factors is
quite sharp. This sharpness further indicates the strong retreat to the
"right-privilege" distinction as a legitimate basis upon which to adjudicate constitutional challenges to procedures or reasons for denying,
terminating, reducing, or adding eligibility conditions for, welfare assistance or any other type of benefit which the government has no affirmative obligation to provide. It thereby also indicates a willingness
on the part of the Burger Court majority to cut into the "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine developed by the Warren Court to protect
the governed from the potential of abuses of power by those who govern.
The attitude of the Burger Court majority toward the second factor-the group interest or society's stake in the welfare sysem-is evidenced most clearly in Justice Blackmun's opinions in Perales and
James. It also is implicit in the no-review and the affirmation of filing
fees for judicial review decisions in Wright and Ortwein, respectively.
That attitude, in summary, is: (a) insensitivity with respect to the
interest of welfare claimants as a group, or, a "wishful-thinking" kind
of unstated assumption that the group interest of welfare claimants
magically coincides with that of society in general, and (b) cynical
pragmatism with respect to society's interest or stake in the welfare
system. This cynical pragmatism is reflected in several notions running throughout these four post-Goldberg decisions. Among them are
the notions that the welfare system is primarily a problem for those
who administer it, and not one for the courts; that the best thing to
do in most welfare procedure cases is to leave well enough alone; and,
that as long as the system seems to work fairly and competently over
all, it is in everyone's interest, especially the taxpaying public's, to
minimize the adversary or judicial aspects of welfare administration
and, above all, to minimize costs.
In discussing the contention of the disability insurance claimant
in Perales that the Social Security Administration's hearings lack basic
procedural safeguards required by the due process clause, and in attempting to distinguish the case from Goldberg,4 ' Justice Blackmun
149.

402 U.S. at 406-07. See text accompanying notes 39-44 supra.
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describes the nature and desirability of current Social Security Administrative hearings as follows:
The system's administrative structure and procedures, with essential determinations numbering into the millions, are of a size and
extent difficult to comprehend. But, as the Government's brief
here accurately pronounces, "Such a system must be fair-and it
must work."' 50
[Sitrict rules of evidence, applicable in the courtroom, are
not to operate at social security hearings . . . . [Tjhere emerges
an emphasis upon the informal rather than the formal. This, we
think, is as it should be, for this administrative procedure, and
these hearings, should be understandable to the layman claimant,
should not necessarily be stiff and comfortable only for the trained
attorney,
and should be liberal and not strict in tone and opera5
tion.1 1

With over 20,000 disability claim hearings annually, the cost
of providing live medical testimony at those hearings, where need
had not been demonstrated by a request for a subpoena, over and
above the cost of the examinations requested by hearing examiners, would be a substantial drain on the trust
fund and on the
5 2energy of physicians already in short supply.
A simple comparison of the above remarks of Justice Blackmun in
Perales with statements of Justice Brennan in Goldberg, such as "welfare guards against the societal malaise that may flow from a widespread sense of unjustified frustration and insecurity;"' 53 welfare "is
not mere charity, but a means to 'promote the general Welfare;"""
and, "the same governmental interest that counsels the provision of
welfare, counsels as well its uninterrupted provision to those eligible
to receive it,' 55 make clear the sharp difference in attitude between
the Goldberg majority and the Perales majority -towards the second
factor.
This attitudinal disparity toward the second factor between the
Goldberg majority and the majority in the four post-Goldberg decisions
is manifested just as clearly in the following remarks of Justice Blackmun in James:
1. The public's interest in this particular segment of the
area of assistance to the unfortunate is protection and aid for the
dependent child whose family required such aid for that child.
The focus is on the child and, further, it is on the child who is
dependent. There is no more worthy object of the public's concern ...
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 399-401, 406 (citations omitted).
Id. at 400-01.
Id. at 406.
397 U.S. at 265. See text accompanying note 109 supra.
Id.

155. Id.
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2. The [welfare] agency . . . is fulfilling a public trust.
The State . . . has appropriate and paramount interest and con-

cern in seeing and assuring that the intended and proper objects
of that tax-produced assistance are the ones who benefit from the
aid it dispenses.
3. One who dispenses purely private charity naturally has
an interest in and expects to know how his charitable funds are
utilized and put to work. The public, when it is the provider,
rightly expects the same. It might well expect more, because of
the trust aspect of public funds ....
4. The emphasis of the New York statutes and regulations
[governing the "home visit"] [is the same as the] federal emphasis. . . . It is upon "assistance and rehabilitation"....
5. The home visit . . . is [at] "the heart of welfare administration" . .. .15

According to Justice Blackmun in James, then, the primary interests of society, or of the taxpaying public, in welfare administration
procedures are, not to ensure a "rule of law" for welfare recipients
as well as for citizens generally, as the Goldberg majority viewed
it, but rather to ensure: first, that the AFDC child's needs are
made paramount insofar as they conflict with the AFDC mother's,
second, that those who recieve welfare assistance are those who really
are entitled to it; third, that the public, or at least the responsible welfare officials, know how welfare recipients spend their charity; fourth,
that welfare recipients are rehabilitated as well as provided financial
assistance; and, fifth, that traditional methods of enforcing the first four
interests-in this case, the home visit-are continued. Moreover, society, or the taxpaying public, also has a strong interest in ensuring
that evidence of a crime observable by a welfare official during a home
visit is in fact observed and seized, even though that visit should not
be considered by the welfare recipient to be any sort of criminal investigation.' 57 Another societal interest is that the welfare recipient not
get the advantage of both sides of the kind of choice to which all
citizens seeking government largesse, such as taxpayers claiming a deduction, are put theoretically. Assurance of this latter interest is
accomplished by requiring individual welfare claimants to either sub156. 400 U.S. at 318-20.
157. "The home visit is not a criminal investigation . . . and despite the announced fears of Mrs. James and those who would join her, is not in aid of any criminal proceeding ....
And if the visit should, by chance, lead to the discovery of
fraud and a criminal prosecution should follow, then, even assuming that the evidence
discovered upon the home visitation is admissible, an issue upon which we express no
opinion, that is a routine and expected fact of life and a consequence no greater than
that which necessarily ensues upon any other discovery by a citizen of criminal conduct." Id. at 323.
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mit to the welfare administration's methods for determining eligibility
or give up their so-called "right" to receive assistance. And, as Justice
Blackmun sees it, the choice is entirely that of the welfare claimant. 58
The James majority thus views the societal interest in the welfare
system, in terms of both its existence and its procedures, in basically
the same light as the Perales majority views it. In both James and
Perales, the majority believes that the basic goal of the Court in welfare procedure cases should be to preserve traditional procedures still
considered desirable by the welfare bureaucracy. That is, leave well
enough alone so as not to distrub the status quo; allow maximum administrative flexibility and conservation of resources; and assist welfare
officials in their attempt to ensure that only those individuals in fact
entitled to assistance receive it.
While the James majority opinion suggests an even more restrictive or "protective" view of the societal interest in the welfare system
than is suggested in the Perales majority opinion, this difference is
one of degree only. It is a difference which is due in large part to
the fact that Perales involves the Social Security disability insurance
program, while James involves the AFDC program-a program which
provides financial assistance to protect dependent children by funneling that assistance through the most suspect cateogry of welfare recipient for the Burger Court, namely, the AFDC mother. As discussed
above,' 9 an AFDC mother such as Mrs. James is seen as seeking
welfare assistance on terms of her own, and, therefore, terms which
necessarily conflict with society's interest in supporting her child.
Thus, at least in the AFDC context, society's greatest stake definitely
is not in ensuring a "rule of law" for everyone as the Goldberg majority saw it, but, rather, in ensuring that poor mothers who get the
benefit of society's charity do not abuse that charity for their own individual advantage. This view of the societal stake in the welfare system is predicated upon the same attitudes toward welfare recipients
158. Id. at 324. "It seems to us that the situation is akin to that where an internal revenue service agent, in making a routine civil audit of a taxpayer's income
tax return, asks that the taxpayer produce for the agent's review some proof of a deduction the taxpayer has asserted to his benefit in the computation of his tax. If the
taxpayer refuses, there is, absent fraud, only a disallowance of the claimed deduction
and a consequent additional tax. The taxpayer is fully within his 'rights' in refusing
to produce the proof, but in maintaining and asserting those rights a tax detriment
results and it is a detriment of the taxpayer's own making. So here Mrs. James has
the 'right' to refuse the home visit, but a consequence in the form of cessation of aid,
similar to the taxpayers resultant additional tax, flows from that refusal. The choice
is entirely hers, and nothing of constitutional magnitude is involved." Id.
159. See text accompanying notes 132-43 supra.
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that underlie treating welfare assistance as a "privilege" rather than
as a "right", something which Justice Blackmun explicitly does in
James, as seen above. 160
The attitude of the majority in the four post-Goldberg decisions
towards the third factor-the nature of the welfare bureaucracy and
those officials who administer it, especially those who have individual
contact with welfare recipients---differs from that of the Goldberg majority in much the same way as the attitudes of the post-Goldberg and
Goldberg majorities differ toward the second factor. Also, this attitudinal difference again is manifested most clearly in Justice Blackmun's opinions in Peralesand James.
Unlike the healthy skepticism of the Goldberg majority,' 6 ' the
majorities in Perales and James display an attitude of trust and confidence in the fairness and competency of both the welfare bureaucracy
and the individual welfare official. Thus, for example, in concluding
that the hearsay medical report constitutes sufficient evidence to support the hearing examiner's no-disability finding in Perales, Justice
Blackmun makes the following arguments:
1. The identity of the five reporting physicians is significant.
Each report presented here was prepared by a practicing physician
who had examined the claimant. A majority [of these physicians] were called into the case by the state agency. Although
each received a fee . . . [w]e cannot, and do not, ascribe bias
to the work of these independent physicians ....
2. The vast workings of the social security administrative
system make for reliability and impartiality in the consultant reports. . . . We do not presume on this record to say that it works
unfairly.
3. One familiar with medical reports and the routine of the
medical examination . . . will recognize their elements of detail
and of value ....
4. The reports present the impressive range of examination
to which Perales was subjected. . .
It is fair to say that the
claimant received professional examination and opinion on a scale
beyond the reach of most persons and that this case reveals a patient and careful endeavor by the state agency and the examiner
to ascertain the truth.
9. There is an additional and pragmatic factor which, although not controlling, deserves mention. [It is the fact that] over
20,000 disability claim hearings [are held] annually, [and] the cost
of providing live medical testimony at those hearings, where
need has not been demonstrated by a request for a subpoena ...
160. 400 U.S. at 319. See text accompanying note 80 supra.
161. See text beginning at note 121 supra.
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would be a substantial drain on the 62
trust fund and on the energy
of physicians already in short supply.'
An argument similar to those above is put forth by Justice Blackmun
to show that the problems with the challenged procedures in Goldberg,
which required the procedural safeguards -there mandated under the
due process clause, do not arise in the administrative context of Perales:
The Perales proceeding is not the same [as that involved in
Goldberg]. [Tihe specter of questionable credibility and veracity is not present; there is professional disagreement with the medical conclusions, to be sure, but there is no attack here upon the
doctors' credibility or veracity.' 6 3
In rejecting the claimant's contentions that the use of government
paid medical advisers in the disability hearings and the multiple roles
played by the hearing examiner in those hearings violate procedural
due process, Justice Blackmun argues:
Inasmuch as medical advisers are used in approximately 13% of
disability claim hearings, comment as to this practice is indicated.
We see nothing "reprehensible" in the practice . . . . The trial
examiner is a layman; the medical adviser is a board-certified specialist. He is used primarily in complex cases for explanation of
medical problems in terms understandable to the layman-examiner. He is a neutral adviser.
Neither are we persuaded by the advocate-judge-multiple-hat
suggestion. It assumes too much and would bring down too many
procedures designed, and working well, for a governmental structure of great and growing complexity. The social security hearing
examiner, furthermore, does not act as counsel. He acts as an
examiner charged with developing the facts. The 44.2% reversal
rate for all federal disability hearings in cases where the state attorney does not grant benefits . . . attests to the
164 fairness of the
system and refutes the implication of impropriety.
Comparing the above excerpts from Justice Blackmun's majority
opinion in Perales with Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Goldberg, especially those portions delineating the reasons for selecting
those procedural safeguards which are minimally necessary under the
due process clause, 1 65 and with the following excerpts from Justice
Douglas' dissent in Perales, reveals the sharp difference in attitude
between the Goldberg majority and the Burger-court majority toward

the third factor-the nature of the welfare bureaucracy, and the fair162.
163.
164.
165.
106, 111

402 U.S. at 402-04, 406 (citations omitted).
Id. at 407. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
Id. at 408, 410.
397 U.S. at 262-65, 267-71. See text accompanying notes 33-34, 36-38, 78,
supra.
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ness and reliability of its procedures and of those individuals who administer or participate in them. Justice Douglas (joined by Justices
Black and Brennan), dissenting in Perales, adheres to a view of the
welfare bureaucracy and welfare officials which, like the view he espoused in his dissent in James,166 is much more skeptical than the
view manifested in Justice Blackmun's opinion in Perales and in the
holdings of Wright and Ortwein. He describes the administrative situation in which the claimant in Peralesis trapped as follows:
This case is minuscule in relation to the staggering problems
of the Nation. But when a grave injustice is wreaked on an individual by the presently powerful federal bureaucracy, it is a matter
of concern to everyone, for these days the average man can say:
"There but for the grace of God go I."
Judge Spears who first heard this case said that the way hearing officers parrot "almost word for word the conclusions" of the
"medical adviser" produced "nausea" in him ....
Review of the evidence is of not value to us [in a case such
as this]. The vice is in the procedure which allows it in without
testing it by cross-examination. Those defending a claim look
to defense-minded experts for their salvation. Those who press
for recognition of a claim look to other experts. The problem
of the law is to give advantage to neither ....
The use of HEW of its stable of defense doctors without submitting them to a cross-examination is the cutting of cornersin which certainly the Government should not ina practice
67
dulge.'

Two somewhat mutually contradictory attitudes toward welfare
caseworkers expressed in James evidence the distance backwardsback to the era of Flemming v. Nestor,'6" with its, in Professor Charles
Reich's terms, feudal view of property rights' 6 9 -the Court has traveled since its 1970 decision in Goldberg. This is especially true when
these two attitudes are considered together with the attitudes toward
medical advisors, hearing examiners, and the welfare complex as a
whole, displayed in the Peralesmajority decision.
Justice Blackmun in James views the welfare caseworker as both
(a) an individual acting in good faith pursuant to prescribed welfare
procedures for the benefit of the welfare claimant, and (b) an individual whose word, with respect to the ability of members of his or
166. 400 U.S. at 335. See note 131 supra.
167. 402 U.S. at 413-14 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
168. 363 U.S. 603 (1960). See text accompanying note 24 and note 25 supra.
169. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 769-70 (1964). See also note
22 supra.
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her own profession to carry out the positive rehabilitative purposes of
the home visit, is not to be taken seriously or trusted. Justice Blackmun displays these two contradictory attitudes towards the welfare
caseworker in the course of describing one of the factors he lists to
support James' conclusion that even if the home visit is a search within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, it is not unreasonable and
therefore not violative of that Amendment. Justice Blackmun assumes for purposes of argument that the home visit is a search because
he recognizes, or purports to recognize, that "ithe home visit is . . .
both rehabilitative and investigative, ' '17 and "(perhaps because the
average [AFDC] beneficiary might feel she is in no position to refuse
'1 7
consent to the visit). '
One of the reasons for finding the home visit to be a reasonable
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment is: "The visit
is not one by police or [by anyone in] uniformed authority.' 172 In
thus attempting to distinguish the home visit from other types of administrative searches which have been held subject to the warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment,1"" Justice Blackmun focuses
upon the ability of and the function performed by the person conducting the search, and the appearance of that person to the individual
whose home is being visited. The caseworker conducting the home
visit is not like a police officer for the majority in James because the
former is "a caseworker of some training whose primary objective is,
or should be, the welfare, not the prosecution of the [welfare] recipient,"'174 and because "[t]he caseworker is not a sleuth but rather,
we trust, is a friend to one in need."' 75
The notion that the home visit need not be subjected to the procedural safeguards of the Fourth Amendment because the caseworker
conducting the visit is a friend as opposed to a sleuth is similar to
Justice Blackmun's explicit reliance in Perales on the competency and
good faith of both the medical advisers hired by HEW and the hearing
examiners. In the latter case, as in James, Justice Blackmun not only
believes in the facts about the welfare officials upon which he ex170. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 317 (1971).
171. Id. at 318.
172. Id. at 322.
173. Justice Blackmun states that neither Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523 (1967), nor See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), is "inconsistent with
our result here." 400 U.S. at 324-25. See note 95 and text accompanying notes 9396 supra.
174. 400 U.S. at 322-23.
175. Id. at 323.
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plicitly relies, but also he uses these facts to justify upholding an eligibility procedure which falls far short of the type of hearing required
in Goldberg.
Thus, in James, the fact that the welfare official conducting the
home visit is or should be viewed by the welfare recipient as a friend
providing assistance rather than an enemy looking for criminal evidence somehow means that a welfare recipient such as Mrs. James
should not even object to a home visit, let alone suggest-and suggest
to the point of bringing a lawsuit-that the home visit lacks constitutionally required procedural safeguards. While the logic of this argument escapes me, it makes sense when considered in the light of the
other arguments and assumptions in Justice Blackmun's decision in
James and the majority opinions in Perales, Wright, and Ortwein.
The way in which this non-sequiter most makes sense is to look at
it in light of a feeling running throughout the four post-Goldberg majority opinions. That feeling-which is never made as explicit as some
of the other attitudes toward the welfare claimant held by the Burger
court majority, but which naturally flows from those other attitudesis resentment176 toward the welfare claimant who takes his or her
complaint against the welfare bureaucracy to court. Such a welfare
claimant is obviously not sufficiently grateful for the charity which society is so benevolently providing. Thus, he or she is not a person
worth protecting by allowing him or her to receive financial assistance
without paying for it by selling his or her constitutional rights.
This resentment toward the individual welfare claimant who attempts to assert his or her constitutional right against the welfare bureaucracy, which is an undercurrent in the four post-Goldberg majority
opinions, is obviously contrary to the Goldberg majority's view of both
the welfare claimant and the welfare bureaucracy. Moreover, the
"friend rather than sleuth" reason for this resentment is a symptom
of what I earlier described as "wishful thinking"'177 on the part of the
Burger Court majority with respect to both the group interest and society's stake in the procedural characteristics of the welfare system.
It is also factually inaccurate, as Justice Marshall points out in his dissent in James:
No one questions the motives of the dedicated welfare caseworker.
Of course, caseworkers seek to be friends, but the point is that
they are also required to be sleuths. . . . [A]ppellants have
strenuously emphasized the importance of the visit to provide evi176. See generally M. SCHELER,
177.

RESSENTIMENT (1961).

See text beginning at note 148 supra.
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dence leading to civil forfeitures including elimination of benefits
and loss of child custody.
Actually, the home visit is precisely the type of [administrative] inspection [which this Court has held to be a search subject
to the178warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment in prior
cases]
except that the welfare visit is a more severe intrusion
upon privacy and family dignity ....
[The home visit, like
many housing inspections, may lead to criminal convictions.
. . . [A]part from the issue of consent, there is neither logic
in, nor precedent for, the view that the ambit of the Fourth
Amendment depends not on the character of the governmental intrusion but on the size of the club that the State wields against
a resisting citizen. Even if the magnitude of the penalty were
relevant, which sanction for resisting the search is more severe?
For protecting the privacy of her home, Mrs. James lost the sole
means of support for herself and her infant son. For protecting
the privacy of his commercial warehouse, Mr. See [the defendant
who successfully challenged an administrative search as violative
of the Fourth Amendment] received a $100 suspended fine.'1 9
The other basis upon which Justice Blackmun distinguishes the
welfare official conducting the home visit from a police officer conducting a typical search-that the former is "a caseworker of some
training"--is inconsistent with the "friend not sleuth" notion. This
inconsistency is due to Justice Blackmun's refusal to believe the statements about training, competency, personnel turn-over, time pressures,
caseloads, and other factors about the actual job situation of those welfare officials conducting the home visit which are put forth in the amicus brief written on behalf of those very officials.' 80 In that amicus
brief, the New York caseworkers argued that the home visit rule
should be held unconstitutional because it was impossible, given the

factors about training, caseload, etc., for the welfare officials charged
with conducting the visits to actually fulfill the positive rehabilitative
purposes which allegedly justify the intrusion into the AFDC mother's
home in this kind of case. This disbelief on the part of the James
majority is disconcerting, not only because it is inconsistent with other
assumptions about the welfare officials conducting the visit, but also
because it portrays a majority of the Supreme Court justices as wearing
social blinders. Even worse, this disbelief evidences a willingness on
the part of the Burger Court majority to select those facts about the welfare system and about the individuals who administer it which are favorable to the legal conclusion desired, rather than accepting or at least
accurately perceiving all the facts and then considering all of them
178. See notes 93-95 and accompanying text supra.
179.
180.

400 U.S. at 339-41.
See BRTDNO, supranote 1, at 988-93, where the amicus brief is excerpted.
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in reaching a legal conclusion.
This disbelief of the welfare caseworkers' characterization of their
own ability to conduct the home visits and the manner in which the
visits are actually conducted, is explicitly articulated by Justice Blackmun in James. As a footnote to the statement that the home visit
"is made by a caseworker of some training,"'' Justice Blackmun
states:
The amicus brief submitted on behalf of the Social Services
Employees Union Local 371, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, the bargaining
representative for the social service staff employed in the New
York City Department of Social Services, recites that "caseworkers
are either badly trained or untrained" and that "[gienerally, a
caseworker is not only poorly trained but also young and inexperienced * * *." Despite this astonishing description by the union
of the lack of qualification of its own members for the work they
are employed to do, we must assume that the caseworker8 2possesses
at least some qualifications and some dedication to duty.'
This insistence on assuming that the caseworkers conducting the
home visit are able to conduct it so that the presumed constructive,
benign purposes of the mandatory visit rule are served, contrary to
the caseworkers' own statements about how they actually conduct the
home visits, reflects a judicial posture that is common to all four postGoldberg decisions here discussed. That posture is an attitude of trust
and confidence in the welfare bureaucracy and those who administer
it along with a selective perception of the facts about the welfare bureaucracy and its officials and a selective confidence in, or reliance
upon, the view of the functioning of the bureaucracy put forth by those
who actually administer the challenged bureaucratic procedure. Such
a combination of trust and confidence along with selective factual perception and belief is, needless to say, deadly for the individual welfare claimant, welfare claimants generally, and for society at large, especially
if society's stake in the welfare system is that seen by the Goldberg
majority. Insofar as society's stake in the welfare system diverges
from that articulated in Goldberg, and insofar as the Supreme Court
sees the societal stake differently and bases constitutional decisions
on that difference, the loser is not only the individual welfare claimant
facing the welfare bureaucracy with inadequate procedural safeguards;
the loser is society generally, including all of those who pay taxes to
support the welfare system. Without an even-handed application, the
"rule of law" cannot survive for, and therefore cannot ultimately protect, anyone.
181.

400 U.S. at 322.

182.

Id. at 322-23 n.11.

